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1.  J. David Richardson 
U.S. Trade Policy in the 1980s: Turns-and  Roads Not 
Taken 
This paper is an assessment of  turning points in U.S. trade policy during the 
1980s, of their economic and political causes, and of whether there might have 
been other roads not taken. It is not a detailed political economic history’ and 
is purposely selective in its treatment. 
Section 10.1 describes the unfavorable U.S. trade policy environment of the 
1980s and  U.S. policy  responses to it,  emphasizing three  significant new 
“tilts”-minilateralism,  managed trade, and congressional activism. Section 
10.2 assesses alternative courses of action, how outcomes might have differed, 
The author is indebted to Robert E. Baldwin for sparking his enthusiasm for these topics over 
the years as well as for his detailed and insightful comments on a previous draft. He is also in- 
debted to more than the usual number of commentators since in this case many of the following 
people provided answers to the “why?’ questions that were part of the mandate for the paper. All 
deserve much credit: Raymond J. Aheam, C. Michael Aho, Robert E. Baldwin, Thomas 0.  Bayard, 
C. Fred Bergsten, Geoffrey Carliner, William R. Cline, I. M. Destler, Geza Feketekuty, Martin 
Feldstein, Anne 0. Krueger, Paul R. Krugman, Robert E. Litan, Keith E. Maskus, Allan Men- 
delowitz, Michael Mussa, Lionel Olmer, Alfred Reifman, Robert Rogowsky,  Jeffrey J. Schott, 
Susan Schwab, Paula Stem, John W.  Suomela, and Murray Weidenbaum. 
1. Destler (1986) is the politicalleconomichistorical Bible for 1980-86  and roots  from the 
1970s. Destler (1990) updates the earlier work. Pearson (1989) is a briefer but also comprehensive 
evaluation of the period 1980-88.  See also still briefer treatments by Baldwin (1990), Deardorff 
(1989), Niskanen (1988, 137-54). and Vernon and Spar (1989, chap. 3). 
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and what the risks might have been. Section 10.3 briefly sizes the trade policy 
actions and alternatives described earlier.* 
10.1  What Happened in the 1980s: A Review 
There is a difference of opinion among commentators on U.S. trade policy 
in the 1980s. At one extreme is the “devil-made-me-do-it” camp. It believes 
that laudable trade policy intentions of  the Reagan administration were over- 
whelmed by  unfavorable circumstances. It grants that some of those circum- 
stances were of the administration’s own macroeconomic making yet observes 
that others were historical legacies and random bad luck. Niskanen’s (1988, 
137)  view verges toward this camp: “Trade policy in the Reagan administration 
is best described as a strategic retreat. The consistent goal of the president was 
free trade, both in the United States and abroad. In response to domestic politi- 
cal pressure, however, the administration imposed more new restraints on trade 
than any administration since Hoover. A strategic retreat is regarded as the 
most difficult military maneuver and may be better than the most likely alterna- 
tive, but it is not a satisfactory outcome.” Another commentator has remarked 
similarly, “Unprecedented pressures breed unprecedented reactions.” 
At the other extreme is the “venality” camp. It turns the quotation on its 
head:  “Unprincipled trade policy  invites  unprecedented trade policy  pres- 
sures.” Verging toward this point of  view  is Pearson (1989, 36, 65): “The 
record  of  the Reagan administration in resisting new  import protection is 
weak. . . . [On the export side,] . . . the same administration that has taken a 
restrictive view of government’s role in domestic unfair trade-for  example, 
the antitrust area-has  had few reservations about seeking out and challenging 
foreign unfair trade practices. The explanation would appear to be in a trade 
policy grounded in pragmatic politics, not in principle.” 
Regardless of  camp, all commentators agree that environmental circum- 
stances and policy intentions cohabit to produce policy responses. Deardorff 
(1989, 20-22),  citing Baldwin (1982), describes this as the crossing of  the 
demand for protection with its supply. 
In that spirit, this section summarizes first the U.S. trade policy environment 
of the 1980s and then the U.S. trade policy responses. 
10.1.1  Trade Policy Environments 
The  Historical  Environment 
The trade policy environment of the 1980s inherited and accentuated several 
legacies from the 1970s. Chief among them in the United States was growing 
2. Members of the US.  trade policy community have been extraordinarily helpful in preparing 
this assessment. Many are still active in the government. They are referred to below, without attri- 
bution, as “sources” or “commentators.” 629  Trade Policy 
sensitivity to trade policy as domestic policy, not just foreign policy, and to 
the U.S. spillovers of  industrial policy abroad, which was often perceived to 
be unfair. 
Growing U.S.  sensitivity to the domestic effects of  trade policy reflected 
growing U.S. dependence on exports and imports, the decline in U.S. hege- 
monic and market power (see, among many others, Baldwin 1990, 10-12;  and 
Richardson 1984, 1-2),  and a decreasing need for trade policy to function as 
foreign policy as the cold war cooled. The average of goods and services ex- 
ported and those imported stood at over 12 percent of U.S. gross national prod- 
uct in 1980: it had been just over 6 percent in 1970. But it showed almost no 
further rise in the 1980s, standing still at just over 12 percent in 1989. 
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) had  shaken 
U.S.-led Western hegemony in the 1970s. It set the stage for macroeconomic 
policy reversal in the early 1980s as a result of its massive 1979-80 increase 
in contract oil prices. U.S. unemployment surged from 5.8 to 7.0 percent be- 
tween 1979 and 1980, and inflation rose from 11.3 to 13.5 percent3  with fears 
of further stagflationary aftershocks  from OPEC’s action. Macroeconomic  pol- 
icy was about to change radically, and, with it, trade policy. 
OPEC’s ideological and creditor support for developing-country industrial- 
ization also helped produce the first fruit of  “newly industrializing country” 
(NIC) export SUCC~SS.~  Industrial targeting and subsidies were growing, not 
only in the NICs, but in developed countries as well, as governments debated 
the merits of  industrial policy and wrestled with structural change forced by 
energy prices and NIC SUCC~SS.~  Sectoral surge and collapse spilled across bor- 
ders as world trade continued to grow faster than world output during the 
1970s. 
US. trade policy in the 1970s was becoming more and more sensitive to 
perceptions of “unfair” trade. Both the Trade Act of  1974, authorizing U.S. 
participation in the Tokyo Round, and the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, im- 
plementing its agreements, facilitated the quest for “relief” from unfair trade 
practices abroad. Relief was delivered by  various barriers to trade. By  the 
1980s, what had been sensitivity became certainty (see, among others, Bald- 
win 1990, 14-17;  Hufbauer 1989, 125-28;  or Pearson 1989,72-75), and U.S. 
trade policy increasingly accepted the mandate of facilitating “free but fair” 
trade, not just free trade.‘j 
The Tokyo Round itself had a strong core of  fair trade activism, with its 
codes on dumping, subsidies,  government procurement, and customs-valuation 
3. This is the year-to-year change in the consumer price index for all items; the inflation rate for 
4. See, e.g., the first comprehensive report on the phenomenon in OECD (1979). 
5. A recent paper on the history of industrial subsidies in the OECD is Ford and Suyker (1990). 
6.  Ronald Reagan in essence baptized the mandate in his “free but fair” speech in September 
1978 had been 7.7 percent. 
On industrial policy, CBO (1983) is a useful survey. 
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and import-licensing  procedures. U.S. expectations  for the success of the codes 
ranged from cautious optimism to skepticism in the early 1980s. But events 
were soon to overwhelm the impact of even the more successful codes,’ with 
the result that the United States entered the 1980s not only suspicious  of perva- 
sive “unfair” trade but suspicious of betrayal too. The raw undercurrents were 
that codes should have ameliorated the inequities, but didn’t; that our trading 
partners were not  only unfair, but deceitful; that  “once burned (by GATT 
agreements), twice shy.” U.S. fair trade activism, born in the 1970s, was to 
reach adolescent self-confidence in the 1980s.* 
The Economic Environment 
The economic environment for U.S. trade policy in the 1980s was domi- 
nated by  the dramatic decline and sluggish recovery of  the U.S. balance of 
trade. The trade balance in turn was influenced by  the sharp early and mid- 
1980s breaks in monetary, fiscal, and foreign exchange policies and by  the 
shifting ideologies that prompted them. Also important, but secondary, were 
perceived changes in the structure of U.S. trade: apparent losses of competitive 
advantage in manufactures, especially high-technology manufactures; inade- 
quate and dubious gains of  competitive advantage in business services; in- 
creasing specialization on narrow product varieties; and outsourcing. A third 
economic influence toward the end of the period was the reacceleration of for- 
eign direct investment in the United States, especially through takeovers. 
The story of the U.S. trade balance in the 1980s is familiar, although in- 
volved. Its main features are best summarized in the paper on exchange rate 
policy by Jeffrey Frankel, although its deeper roots are in the companion pa- 
pers on macroeconomic policies by Michael Mussa and James Poterba (all in 
this volume). 
U.S. trade policy in the 1980s ended up a weak and unwilling handmaiden 
to macroeconomics. It was forced into trying to do what macroeconomic pol- 
icy could or would not do and has been ultimately unsuccessful in the attempt. 
The trade balance deteriorated  precipitously in the early 1980s,  as shown in fig. 
10.1. Pressures to protect devastated US.  industries and regions (especially the 
industrial “Rust Belt” in the mid-Atlantic and Midwest states) reached feverish 
intensity. U.S.  trade officials tried to diffuse these pressures and to bandage 
together a wounded protrade constituency by  export-market-opening initia- 
tives. But they were constantly fighting a rearguard a~tion.~  Protectionist and 
7. Grieco (1990, esp. chaps. 3-5)  is one of the most recent and comprehensive assessments of 
the Tokyo Round codes. See also Stem, Jackson, and Hoekman (1986) or Foster (1983). 
8. As Pearson (1989,72-75)  remarks, it is curious that this legacy of the 1970s is almost entirely 
perception. There is no evidence that world trade had become any less fair on average during the 
1970s or  1980s or less fair toward the United States. Nor is there any evidence that US. trade 
practices are fairer than those of its trading partners on average. 
9. They were also fighting against the conclusion of most economic research that trade policies 
have unpredictable and only fairly small effects on the trade balance in the long run (after prices 
and exchange rates respond fully). For an early discussion of the point, see McCulloch and Rich- 631  Trade Policy 
Fig. 10.1  The monthly U.S. trade balance, 1981-90  current dollar exports, 
f.a.s., less general imports, customs value, seasonally adjusted [except 19861) 
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce (1990, exhibit 2); and President of  the United States 
(1990 and earlier issues, tables B-101-B-105). 
market-opening pressures receded only mildly in the later 1980s as the trade 
balance itself was slow to recover in response to macroeconomic and exchange 
rate reversals, as shown also in fig. 10.1  .lo 
Changing trade structure also played an important role, although its influ- 
ence was hard to separate from trade balance. Perceptions of impending loss 
of production capability in manufactures buttressed the case for protecting au- 
tos, steel, semiconductor chips, and machine tools (discussed below). Export- 
promotion  initiatives for high-technology products and  services were but- 
tressed by perceptions of unfair market blockage abroad and subsidies to local 
competitors. Figure 10.2 illustrates the plight of several familiar industries in 
the early 1980s. The import share shoots up for all, sometimes doubling in 
a mere four-year span. Export shares decline less precipitously (construction 
machinery and home appliances lose dramatically, however), but in almost ev- 
ery case fall. 
ardson (1986). Although this was widely understood, its force was vitiated by  the urgency of 
political pressures and the belief that short-run effects of protection and export promotion were 
favorable. Favorable to what? was a question rarely addressed. Not likely to unemployment rates, 
which declined steadily from 9.5 percent in 1982-83  to near 5 percent as the decade closed. 
10. The real trade balance, purged of price effects, recovered much more quickly than the dollar 
trade balance in the late 1980s. Although this was well known, it could be quantitatively  assessed 
only with a significant  six to nine-month lag. Monthly figures, on which much of the trade policy 
community hung, became available on a price-adjusted hasis only in late 1989. 632  J. David Richardson 
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Fig. 10.2  Half-decade structure of U.S. trade balances, 1981-85 
Source: Wall Street Journal, 27 October 1986, 1, 12 (original sources: US  Department of 
Commerce and National Associatlon of Manufacturers). 
Figure 10.3, however, shows how perceived structural shifts in U.S. trade 
over the entire 1980s were probably overstated. The high-technology manufac- 
turing trade surplus has more than rebounded from its mid-1980s slump; it 
exceeds the surplus of the early 1980s. The trade surplus in capital goods has 
almost fully recovered its level of the early 1980s. Nonfood consumer goods, 
including autos, have been most sluggish to recover, yet even they show signs 
of  partial restoration. The trade surplus in business services, largely high- 
technology services," has indeed taken off, as perceptions suggested. But the 
structural shifts seem less significant a part of the trade policy environment at 
the end of the 1980s than they did in the middle. 
Finally, table  10.1 documents the increased prominence of  foreign direct 
investment in the U.S. economy.12  Toward the end of  the 1980s, this aspect 
of the economic environment directly influenced important provisions of the 
Omnibus Trade  and  Competitiveness Act  of  1988. It  also increased  U.S. 
weight on TRIMS (trade-related investment measures) in the Uruguay Round 
negotiations. 
A sense of even greater unfairness may be growing in the U.S. trade policy 
community as the 1990s begin. The United States is seen as having had virtual 
free trade in "corporate control:'  unlike its trading partners. Yet, in this view, 
11. Business services include construction, engineering, architecture, consulting, brokerage, 
communications  and reinsurance, management, professional and technical services, research and 
development  assessments,  and miscellaneous other services. 
12. Deardorff (1989, 17-18)  and many others argue that the threat of protectionist U.S. trade 
policy has contributed to the acceleration of direct investment in the United States. 633  Trade Policy 
US. Manufactures  Trade Balances, by End Use, 
1981-90  50, 
Capital Goods 
-  Industrial Supplies ex  Fuels 
m  ,Automotive 
-50 
Consumer Goods (non food) 
-75  -L  _-A- 
1981  82  83  84  85  86  87  88  89  90‘ 
US.  High-Tech  8 Non-High-Tech Manufactures 
Trade Balances, 1980-90 
~  125t 
US.  Total Business Services and Travel 8 
Transportation  Balances, 1978-88 
20, 
l5:9+3-mF377enO>  -lSd--,  ’  ’  ’  ’  ’  ’ 
1978 79  80  81  82  83  84  85  86  87  88 
Fig. 10.3  Full-decade structure of U.S. trade balances (i.e., current-dollar 
exports less imports), 1980-90  (1990 data = [12/5] X  [cumulative January-May 
1990) 
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce (1989, figs. 3.3,3.7,5.3); U.S. Department of 
Commerce (1990, exhibits 3,5,  11). 
it is not clear how the US.  national interest is served by allowing open market 
access to foreign direct investors here while their governments encumber US. 
investors abroad with barriers to entry and mergerhkeover and with perfor- 
mance requirements concerning exports, imports, technology transfer, and lo- 
cal staffinghpplier relationships. The investment aspect of the trade policy 
environment of the 1980s is likely to be one of  the decade’s legacies to the 
I 99Os.I3 
Ideologies, Institutions, Personalities 
U.S. trade policy was also influenced by the personalities, institutions, and 
ideologies of  the 1980s. This was true not only in the timing of  trade policy 
feints and thrusts but in their direction and intensity as well. Three groups were 
involved (in descending importance): the executive branch, Congress, and aca- 
demics. 
In both the Reagan and the Bush administrations,  three ideologies were con- 
13. For example, Levinson (1987) and Reich (1990) have both observed the anomalies that can 
arise when U.S. protection  and trade promotion  policies  benefit resident affiliates of  foreign- 
owned firms, sometimes at the  expense of  overseas affiliates of  US.-owned firms. Traditional 
policies  toward dumping, subsidies,  and import  surges may  become increasingly  irrelevant if 
multinational ownership, interfirm joint ventures, and cross-penetration of markets continue to 
grow (see, e.g., “Some Big U.S. Companies” 1990). Table 10.1  Role OP  Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the U.S. Economy (%),  1977-88 
Measure  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988 
FDI  stock ratioa  2.1  2.4  2.6  3.5  4.0  3.9  4.2  4.8  5.3  6.3  7.6  8.9 
Foreign share of U.S. mfg.b  5.2  5.7  6.6  7.2  9.6  9.8  10.1  10.2  10.8  11.4  12.2  N.A. 
Foreign share of US. 
employmenf  1.7  1.9  2.2  2.6  3.0  3.1  3.2  3.3  3.3  3.4  3.5  N.A. 
Foreign share of mfg. 
employmentd  3.5  3.9  4.8  5.5  6.5  6.6  7.2  7.1  7.6  7.3  7.9  N.A. 
Foreign share of GNP  1.7  1.9  2.2  2.6  3.3  3.3  3.3  3.5  3.5  3.4  N.A.  N.A. 
Foreignshareofmfg.valueadded'3.7  4.1  4.8  5.5  7.6  7.8  8.1  8.4  8.3  8.3  N.A.  N.A. 
~  ~~~ 
Source: Graham and Krugman (1989, table 1.2,  p. 13). 
Note: N.A. = base data not available. 
"FDI stock ratio equals FDI stock as percentage of total net worth of nonfinancial corporations. 
bAssets  of foreign mfg. affiliates as percentage of assets of U.S. mfg. corporations (excluding petroleum refining). 
cEmployment  of foreign affiliates as percentage of total US.  employment. 
*Employment  of foreign mfg. affiliates as percentage of total U.S. employment. 
'Output  of foreign affiliates as percentage of total U.S. output. 
'Mfg. value added of foreign affiliates as percentage of total U.S. mfg. value added. 635  Trade Policy 
tinually represented, but with varying degrees of influence: traditional liberal 
trade ideology, pragmatic political economy, and managed-trade  activism. The 
Council of Economic Advisers most consistently embodied the first (as usual). 
The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), the White House staff, 
and James Baker personally (no matter where housed) most consistently em- 
bodied the second (as usual). The Commerce Department most consistently 
embodied the third (as usual). Traditional liberal trade ideology seemed in as- 
cendance very early in the 1980s, as it was reasonably consistent with the ad- 
ministration’s ubiquitous promarket pressure.14  But it was not very consistent 
either with the government’s legal obligation for trade intervention in well- 
defined cases of injury or inequity or with the macroeconomic devolution that 
seemed at the time to be making such cases the rule and not the exception. 
When the GATT ministerial meeting of  November  1982 (described below) 
produced only acrimony and meager results, traditional liberal trade ideology 
lost initiative and influence.15 For a time, the vacuum was filled with first mild 
and then more ambitious experiments with managed trade (new voluntary re- 
straint arrangements, new  Section 30 1  initiatives, and  the  semiconductor 
agreement, described below). Martin Feldstein and George Shultz resisted 
these initiatives strongly from liberal trade perspectives and with persuasive 
arguments that the trade deficit was due to macroeconomic policies at home, 
not unfair trade policies abroad. Managed-trade proponents could claim no 
clear victories by  1985 as James Baker and the political economy realists ex- 
erted  The ongoing history  of  their experimental managed-trade 
agreements in  the late 1980s has provided no strong support for managed- 
trade activism. Political economy realists have dominated trade policy in the 
executive branch since that time. 
14. But it was far away from the “unilateral” free trade ideology voiced by David Stockman in 
his ruminations (1987, 168-69,  171): “Free trade is merely an extension of  free enterprise; free 
markets don’t stop at the border. But here was a cabinet officer [Drew Lewis] talking protectionism 
[auto import restrictions] in the White House, not two months into the administration.. . .  Don 
Regan, who was a stout free trader, was as mad as I’d ever seen him. Steam was coming out his 
ears. Murray Weidenbaum didn’t show any steam, but he was upset, too. . . .  Industrial policy [such 
as auto protection] therefore sought to use the subsidy, trade and legal powers of the state to 
sustain industries that could no longer sustain themselves. Industrial policy replaced the test of the 
marketplace with raw political power. It locked in obsolete labor and capital to unproductive use. 
It impoverished society. It was the antithesis of supply side.” This extreme textbook view never 
held any ideological sway, even in the early Reagan administration. 
15. William E. Brock as USTR was in any case an uneasy spokesman for liberal trade ideology. 
Besides the “brokering” nature of his office, he was not part of the ideological inner circle of the 
early Reagan team and was under lingering suspicion of pragmatism from his service as Republi- 
can national chairman. But no one else among the top advisers of the early Reagan administration 
had significant  international  vision or sensitivity, and even those with the most sensitivity  underes- 
timated the spillover of domestic policy into international competitiveness  and the trade balance. 
16. It is more accurate to suggest that they were influenced by congressional  activism (described 
below) to exert control. Destler and Henning (1989,104-7) describe the inherent inconsistency of 
laissez-faire ideology in both trade and the foreign exchange market, given the macroeconomic 
picture: “When the Congress forced it to choose, the Reagan Administration .  . .  preferred a regu- 
lated exchange market over regulated traded-goods markets” (p. 106). 636  J. David Richardson 
To the extent that a 535-member, two-party body can be said to have a per- 
sonality or an ideology, Congress tried to fill the executive branch vacuum of 
1983-85.  It began to take atypical initiative in trade policy developments. The 
initiative accelerated until  1985, when the dollar began  declining, with the 
Plaza Agreement and monetary ease ratifying its decline. But the momentum 
of congressional trade policy activism continued through the 1988 passage of 
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act,I7 when Congress returned to its 
more passive and customary role as a sort of board of directors for the execu- 
tive’s management of trade policy. Congressional activism might be best char- 
acterized today as “in remission.” It could rise again in the 1990s, especially 
in the absence of an unexpectedly attractive outcome to the Uruguay Round. 
This, too, may be a 1980s legacy to the 1990s. 
Finally, academic personality and ideology at least mildly supported US. 
trade policy shifts of the 1980s. The growth of “strategic trade policy” research 
and perspective afforded politicians and lobbyists the chance in some cases to 
support their constituencies and self-interest intellectually.’8 More important, 
it undermined the moral force of traditional academic consensus on the near- 
unconditional merits of liberal trade policy. It held out for a more pragmatic 
approach, leaning presumptively toward liberal policies, but not uncondition- 
ally. In strategic trade policy perspectives, the grounds for policy activism 
overlapped substantially with antitrust and technology policy activism: trade 
protectiodpromotion in some cases where it might encourage innovation (e.g., 
by better protecting intellectual property) or in some cases where it might sig- 
nificantly vitiate injurious market power (e.g., by encouraging entry of  new 
firms or by blocking predation on viable incumbent firms). 
10.1.2  The Policy Responses 
The U.S. trade policy response to these environmental influences and pres- 
sures in the 1980s was a two-part mix. One part was increased recourse to the 
normal channels of protection and promotion of  market access. The second 
part was turns ((‘tilts” is more accurate) toward three qualitatively new empha- 
ses in U.S. post-World  War I1 tradition.I9 
Table 10.2 summarizes the increased recourse to normal trade policy chan- 
nels as the U.S. trade balance plummeted. Petitions for trade policy relief in 
1981-85  almost doubled from their late 1970s averages, although the percent- 
age that were successful remains fairly constant at 22 percent.” Actually, the 
17. Aheam and Reifman’s (1984,  1986, 1988) chronicles are the best account of the ebb and 
flow described here. 
18. “New Theory Backs Some Protectionism” was the headline of a September 1985 New York 
Times article. Of the many surveys of strategic trade policy perspectives, Krugman’s (1987) and 
Levinson’s (1988) are especially cogent and accessible. The approach assesses the case for and 
against active trade policy in a world of imperfect (instead of perfect) competition among firms 
and reactive (instead of passive) trading-partner governments. 
19. Each of the turns, however, has antecedents and parallels in U.S. prewar tradition. 
20. Deardorff‘s (1989, table 6) figures from John A. Jackson’s trade action data base yield suc- 
cess rates of 22.2 percent in 1975-80  and 22.7 percent in 1981-85. 637  Trade Policy 
Table 10.2  U.S. Use of Instruments of “Normal” Trade Policy Recourse 
(no. of cases filed) 
Period (annual) Averages  Early 1980s Accentuation 
1975-80  1981-85  1986-88  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985 
Fair trade recourse 
Protection against injury from  fair 
trade (Section 201 cases)  7.5  2.4  2.7  2  1  2  5  2 
Unfair trade recourse 
Protection against unfair dumping 
(Section 701 cases)  28.7  44.4  43.0  13  53  41  37  78 
Protection against unfair subsidies 
(Section 701 cases)  19.2  37.0  10.7  17  100  20  12  36 
Protection against unfair violations 
of intellectual property rights 
(Section 337 cases)  12.8  27.6  18.0  19  20  22  37  40 
Action against other unfair trade 
practices (Section 301 cases)  2.7  4.4  18.0  2  8  1  7  4 
Total unfair  63.4  113.4  76.0  51  181  84  93  158 
Sources: Deardorff (1989, table 6 [relying on a trade-action data base maintained by John H. Jackson]; 
Grinols (1989, table 2); USITC (1988, 1989). 
“success” rate was higher because some allegedly unsuccessful petitions (most 
dramatically the steel industry’s 1984 election-year 20 1 petition) were granted 
through ad hoc managed-trade alternatives (described below). It is striking to 
see in table 10.2 how tightly the number of  cases filed tracks the macroeco- 
nomic cycle, peaking at its trough in 1982. There is also a second peak in most 
series in 1984 or 1985 as the dollar soared still higher and the trade balance 
slumped still lower, even though strong macroeconomic performance had re- 
turned. Petitions then decelerate in 1986-88  (especially in 1988, not shown), 
as the dollar returns to earth and congressional trade policy initiative mounts. 
But the “success” rate doubles to 45 percent in the later period. 
It is also striking to see the near total eclipse of “neutral” recourse to trade 
policy relief  (Section 201 petitions) by  unfair trade petitions that villainize 
trading partners. From 89 percent of all petitions filed in 1975-80, unfair trade 
petitions rise to 98 percent in  1981-85  and remain at 97 percent even af- 
terward. 
Accentuated trade policy activism against unfair practices abroad is not 
merely  a  U.S. phenomenon, however.  Table  10.3 reveals  nearly  the  same 
trends-accentuation  and villainization-in  Australia, Canada, and the Euro- 
pean Community. What was perhaps new  in the  1980s was that the United 
States became just “one of the gang” in its practice of trade policy. 
“Becoming one of the gang” is also the way to characterize the first two of 
the three new tilts in U.S.  trade policy during the 1980s. In the first, the United 
States turned toward more “minilateral” initiatives. Minilateral initiatives are 638  J. David Richardson 
Table 10.3  U.S. and Foreign Use of “Normal” Bade  Policy Recourse (no. of 
actions) 
Period (annual) Averages  Early 1980s  Accentuation 
1979-80  1981-85  1986-88  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985 
United States 
Fair trade recoursea  3.0  4.6  2.7  6  17  63 
Unfair traderecourseb  46.5  113.8  60.0  47  215  76  127  104 
European Community 
Fair trade recoursec  .O  4.8  6.0  0  35  29 
Unfair trade recoursed  40.5  46.2  36.3  48  59  46  43  35 
Canada’ 
Fair trade recourse  .o  .4  .O  1  1000 
Unfair trade recourse  28.0  41.2  78.7  23  73  39  33  38 
Australia‘ 
Fair trade recourse  .O  .2  .O  001  00 
Unfair trade recourse  58.0  68.8  32.7  49  80  87  62  66 
Source: Messerlin (1990, table I). 
“Section 201 cases plus GATT Article XIX safeguard cases. 
bDumping, subsidies, and privately initiated 301 cases only. 
‘EC Regulation 288 cases plus GATT Article XIX safeguard cases. 
dEC  “new trade instrument” cases. 
<Dumping, subsidies, and Australia’s and Canada’s 1979-80 averages represent 1980 figures only. 
those that involve less than the full complement of trading partners. They in- 
clude regional trade liberalization initiatives and “grievance minilaterals,” such 
as the Structural Impediments Initiative with Japan. The essence of all minilat- 
era1 arrangements is that they are preferential, or potentially so. The United 
States essentially began practicing in the 1980s what it preached against in the 
1960s and 1970s: preferential trading arrangements, a much more typical as- 
pect of  European Community and British Commonwealth trade relations and 
of the generalized systems of preferences for developing countries. This new 
tilt is summarized in table 10.4 and discussed further below. 
The United States turned next toward managed-trade initiatives in the 1980s, 
ranging from mild to moderate experimentation. Managed-trade initiatives in- 
sert government agencies into regular international market transactions as reg- 
ulators or monitors. Among the milder managed-trade experiments were vol- 
untary  restraint arrangements on  machine  tools.  The most  thoroughgoing 
experiment was the semiconductor  chip agreement with Japan. Although trade 
management is perceived in the United States to be “what our trading partners 
do:’  neither the allegation nor their alleged success at it is easy to demonstrate. 
It is arguable from U.S. experimentation  in the 1980s that we do it “less well,” 
but it is not clear whether this is vice or virtue. Managed-trade initiatives are 
summarized in table 10.5 and discussed further below. 639  Trade Policy 
Mild initiatives 
Voluntary restraint arrangements with Japan 
Voluntary restraint arrangements with Japan 
on automobiles (1981) 
and Taiwan on machine tools (1986) 
Table 10.4  US.  “Minilateralism” in the 1980s 
Modest initiatives 
Voluntary restraint arrangements with 
Semiconductor Agreement with Japan 
principal suppliers of steel (1985-86) 
(1 986) 
~~ 
RegionaUpreferential trade liberalization 
Caribbean Basin Initiative (1984) 
United States-Israel  Free Trade Area 
Canada-United  States Free Trade Agreement 
(1985) 
(1988) 
“Grievance ” bilarerals/minilaterals 
Section 301 activism after 1985 
Market-oriented sector-selective (MOSS) 
Structural Impediments Initiative with Japan 
negotiations with Japan (1985-86) 
(1989) 
In the third tilt of U.S. trade policy in the 1980s, Congress became a more 
active and directive participant. The unique American separation of  govern- 
ment powers has historically divided the initiatives most relevant to trade pol- 
icy, assigning to the Congress initiative on taxation, including tariffs, and as- 
signing to the executive branch initiative to make treaties (with congressional 
consent). 
For fifty years, however, since the advent of the Trade Agreements Program, 
Congress ceded much of  its broad trade policy initiative to the executive.21 
In the 1980s, Congress began reasserting itself into U.S.  trade policy as an 
independent player. It became a much more active monitor and director of 
USTR and of the general management of trade policy by the executive branch. 
It became an initiator of  significant trade policy legislation and not just the 
sounding board for and ornamentor of administration-initiated  bills. Its accel- 
erated activism (discussed below) is summarized in table 10.6 and enshrined 
in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness  Act of  1988. 
The Turn toward Minilateralism 
The minilateral turn in U.S. trade policy in the 1980s has been the most 
enduring of the three “tilts.” Although the turn toward managed trade began 
earlier in the decade, it was on hold in the later 1980s. Congressional activism 
surged in the mid-1980s and then decelerated in the wake of the 1988 trade 
bill and the commencement of Uruguay Round negotiations. 
U.S. minilateralism  was born in the aftermath of the GATT ministerial meet- 
ings of November 1982.**  Ministerial meetings are traditionally called to begin 
21. Congress has kept, naturally, its initiative to draft narrow, special protection  bills when 
22. So, ironically, was the Uruguay Round of negotiations and the successful 1986 ministerial 
necessary. For discussion, see Baldwin (1985, chaps. 2,4)  or Destler (1986, chaps. 2,4). 
meeting that mandated it. 640  J. David Richardson 
Table 10.6  Growing Congressional Trade-Policy  Activism prior to the 1988 
Omnibus Bill 
Congress (years)  Destler (1986) Countd  Ahearn (1986) Counth 
96th (1979-80)  62 
97th (1981-82)  56 
(-- 10) 
98th (1983-84)  57 
(+a 
99th (1985-86)  93‘ 









Source: Richardson (1988, table 3.6 [based on Destler (1986, 75-76)  and Ahearn (1986)l) 
Note: Figures given are number of trade bills introduced in various U.S. Congresses (and % change 
over previous Congress). 
’Counts bills whose primary purpose was to restrict trade or benefit U.S. producers 
bCounts bills employing twenty trade-related terms, some to expand trade, some to protect, wlth 
various shades based on personal evaluation. 
‘Growth rate between January-September  1985 and January-September  1983 applied to number 
of  bills introduced to 98th Congress: (49/30) X 57. 
d1985  figure times 2. 
each round of the multilateral trade negotiations for which the GATT has been 
renowned. The 1982 meeting was the first since 1973, the beginning of the 
Tokyo Round. 
The 1982 meeting was largely a U.S. initiative. USTR officials had been 
working since the close of the Tokyo Round on an agenda for a new round. 
The agenda was sensibly made up of thorny “old chestnut” issues-agriculture 
and safeguards, especially-and  “new issues” such as rules for rapidly ex- 
panding trade in business services and high-technology goods. The shape of 
this agenda had been presented and discussed at the annual OECD ministerial 
meetings for several years, but without any commitment to act or perhaps ade- 
quate U.S. consultation over the agenda itself. Yet the United States pressed 
quite hard to obtain such a commitment (for November 1982) at the July 1981 
Ottawa economic  summit (Rubin and Graham  1983, 11) of  leaders of  the 
largest  seven industrial countries. Within the  administration at the time,  it 
seemed not only “natural” but supportive of the strong ideological thrust to- 
ward  freer  markets.  Trading  partners,  however, clearly  felt  pressured,  not 
coaxed. They were more now  the equal of  the United  States and naturally 
sought consensus over being coerced. 
In the event, the timing was at best inauspicious. Sixteen months’ prepara- 
tion was less than for the Tokyo Round, although the agenda was broader. 
Unknown to the leaders in mid-1981, the world was then at the portal of the 
deepest global recession since the Great Depression; November 1982 was ap- 
proximately the trough! 
The result was foot-dragging and acrimony of an intensity rarely seen even 641  Trade Policy 
in these naturally intense ministerial meetings. The European Community was 
especially resistant to agricultural liberalization, India and other developing 
countries were dead set against services liberalization, and all accused the 
United States of ramming its agenda onto the table without adequate documen- 
tation, interpretation, persuasion, or quid pro quo. The meeting dissolved in 
bitter frustration after mandating further study of agricultural liberalization and 
sanctioning national studies of  services, to be coordinated by the GATT.23  A 
representative summary of the outcome is Rubin and Graham’s (1983, 11): “It 
was a U.S. show from beginning to end. It represented the best and the worst 
of the American approach to such things-the  best, because it was an earnest 
attempt to lead a faltering trading system and reluctant trading partners forward 
into important new areas; the worst, because it was too ambitious, and it raised 
among political constituencies unrealistic expectations that could not be met, 
leaving them disillusioned with GATT and determined to take corrective trade- 
restrictive actions in the 98th Congress.” 
U.S. trade policy officials were themselves “disillusioned with GATT” after 
this experience. While committed to  ongoing liberalization, GATT  rounds 
seemed a cumbersome and unpredictable vehicle. Reflective evaluation and 
opportunity seemed to recommend a two-handed approach that could be called 
contingent multilateralism or, more descriptively multilateralism where pos- 
sible, minilateralism where necessary. The United States would continue to 
push for a new GATT round covering important old and new issues. But it 
would simultaneously respond to minilateral opportunities as a supplementary 
insurance policy against multilateral failure.24 
Minilateral opportunities would of course include regional trade liberaliza- 
tion. The Trade and Tariff Act of  1984 included authorization for the president 
to negotiate bilateral free trade areas. But minilateralism would also include 
“grievance” negotiations, aimed at sensitizing trading partners to issues con- 
23. Some commentators suggest that these studies were really what the United States wanted 
from the ministerial in the first place, not (yet) any ministerial commitment to a new multilateral 
round. If so, the 1982 ministerial would have been setting a new precedent for early involvement 
by  ministers. And there is some indication (e.g., Aho and Aronson  1985) that the “study only” 
objective was plan B when it became clear early in 1982 that plan A would fail because of hostile 
trading partners and environments. 
24. The  change  is  visible  between  the  president’s  1982  and  1986 reports  on  the  Trade 
Agreements Program. The 1982  report said, “The United States remains committed to the multilat- 
eral system of the GATT as the primary vehicle for the realization of its own interests and those 
of other trading nations. Thus, the United States gives the highest priority to the deliberations and 
negotiations to be conducted in the upcoming GATT Ministerial meeting” (p. 2). The 1986 report 
said, “The United States remains committed to GATT and the multilateral negotiation process. 
There are gains to be achieved through its discussions that cannot be achieved in other forums. . . . 
Nevertheless, multilateral negotiations are not an end in themselves.. . . America has decided to 
pursue trade liberalization opportunities wherever and whenever they exist, whether in a multilat- 
eral, plurilateral or bilateral context. . . . The purpose of  this strategy is not to supplant but rather 
to supplement GATT. By providing examples of  the types of agreements possible and benefits 
promised, American believes bilateral and plurilateral negotiations can serve as a useful step to- 
ward achieving a multilateral consensus” (p. 61). 642  J. David Richardson 
cerning U.S.  market  access, especially in  services, agriculture, and  high- 
technology products. USTR officials first encouraged Section 301 petitions as 
a way of carrying out these “grievance minilaterals” and subsequently devel- 
oped the market-oriented sector-selective (MOSS) approach to Japan over the 
period 1985-86.2s The most elaborate of the grievance minilaterals, the Struc- 
tural Impediments Initiatives (SII), is discussed below. 
Out of the liberalizing minilateral spirit in the mid-1980s came the Carib- 
bean Basin Initiative (CBI) of  1984, the United States-Israel Free Trade Area 
of  1985, and the Canada-United  States Free Trade Agreement of  1989. Each 
successive regional initiative was more important than the previous one. The 
CBI was a tightly constrained “aid-through-(preferential)-trade”  arrangement. 
The agreement with Israel was a long-standing foreign policy initiative on the 
congressional back burner that conveniently allowed the United States to sig- 
nal to trading partners that it really was serious. But it also included liberaliza- 
tion provisions in services. The Canada-United  States Agreement took more 
than three years to negotiate and was a GATT-defensible, across-the-board ini- 
tiative between countries that were each other’s dominant trading partner. Its 
innovations included liberalizing coverage of most services, trade-related in- 
vestment  matters  (TRIMS), and  some  trade-related intellectual  property 
(TRIPS) concerns in pharmaceuticals; innovative dispute-settlement institu- 
tions; and ongoing negotiations over subsidies. All the items were at the same 
time special concerns of the United States in the multilateral Uruguay Round. 
The Bush administration continued the two-handed strategy of multilater- 
alism and minilateralism. It was an active initiator in the Uruguay Round. It 
implemented the institutionalization  of grievance bilaterals in the “Super 30  1  ,” 
“Special 301,” and telecommunications provisions of the 1988 trade act (de- 
scribed below). It actively encouraged Mexico in planning to authorize 1991 
negotiation for a free trade area to encompass all three North American coun- 
tries. And it publicly probed the potential for a hemispheric free trade area in 
its 1990 Enterprise for the Americas initiative. 
The Turn toward Managed Trade 
The United States turned toward managed trade in the early 1980s for auto- 
mobiles, machine tools, steel, and semiconductor  chips. Managed-trade initia- 
tives for the first two covered substantial trade, yet were mild. They amounted 
to negotiated export restraint arrangements with varying degrees of  supplier 
coverage. The managed-trade initiative for chips was, by contrast, more ambi- 
tious,  .involving target market shares beyond U.S. boundaries and other third- 
country practices. Export restraint arrangements in steel, of course, had roots 
in the 1970s and earlier but were expanded in the 1980s. Significant for the 
25.  These  sectoral negotiations covered  telecommunications, pharmaceutical, medical, and 
electronic equipment, and forest products (see Pearson 1989,49; Destler 1986,233-34; and Pres- 
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same reason was U.S. tightening of textile/apparel quotas and rules of origin 
in 1983-84.26 
Most important in the turn toward managed-trade experiments was the dete- 
rioration of the economic environment-the  deep 1981-82  recession, the soar- 
ing 1980-85  dollar, and the slumping 1980-87  trade balance. Of secondary 
importance was the frustration of  the  1982 GATT  ministerial. This caused 
USTR William Brock to lose impetus and influence within the Reagan eco- 
nomic leadership. It was only natural for U.S. Commerce Department activists 
to  find  their  position,  agenda,  and  established  business  constituency  en- 
han~ed.~~ 
Managed-trade experimentation stabilized or diminished in the late 1980s, 
as the economic environment improved, as USTR became itself more aggres- 
sive and Congress more active, and as managed-trade experience was assessed 
to be mixed at best. Yet  it remains dormant, rather than defeated, and could 
easily rise again with economic downturn, Uruguay Round failure, or election 
of a Democratic president in 1992.** 
Voluntary export restraints (VRAs) are the mildest form of  trade manage- 
ment, in which an importing country cajoles a supplier government into serv- 
ing as an agent of the importer government. The agent government is charged 
with  “managing” (moderating) the surge of  supplies to the importer, whose 
government is in essence a passive manager, suggesting targets and monitoring 
the results. As is well known, VRAs are questionably compatible with GATT 
conventions because of their similarity to quantitative import barriers and se- 
lectivity (see Jackson 1988). Yet their political-economic features are in some 
ways attractive. They can compensate an exporting country’s government and 
or firms with implicit revenues from being able to raise prices on reduced sales. 
They  are inherently temporary (degressive) since they  invite a panoply of 
avoidance measures that gradually bleed away their effectivene~s.’~  From these 
points of view, they are very similar to a selective, temporary safeguard with 
compensation. In essence that is what they have become, as virtually all coun- 
tries have reduced their recourse to traditional fair trade import-relief remedies 
(see table 10.3 above).3o  The main liabilities of VRAs are their anticompetitive 
features: their blunting of incentives to compete on price or innovate to reduce 
26. The only development in the 1980s cutting against the managed-trade grain was President 
Reagan’s decision in 1981 not to renew orderly marketing agreements for footwear with Taiwan 
and South Korea. 
27. Niskanen  (1988, 298) quips that Malcolm Baldrige,  Reagan’s  first Commerce secretary, 
“never met an import restraint that he did not like.” 
28. For recent statements of the case for managed trade-trade  “by results, not rules”-see 
ACTPN (  1989) or Tyson (1990). 
29. Avoidance measures include foreign direct investment in the importing country, diversion 
of shipments through unrestrained third countries, quality upgrading or downgrading, and changes 
in the degree of fabrication. 
30. The Reagan administration did grant escape-clause (Section 201) relief to four compara- 
tively small industries: mushrooms, motorcycles,  stainless steel, and wood shakes and shingles 
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costs; their invitation to supemational regulation and cartel-like market sharing 
among incumbent firms, often at the expense of new entrants (their discrimina- 
tory selectivity, sometimes alleged to be a liability, lasts only as long as the 
arrangements themselves are efficaci~us).~’ 
Before the  1980s, the  United  States’s own recourse  to  quantitative and 
managed-trade policies was small compared to its trading partners. During the 
1980s, the United States ceased to be an outlier. Voluntary restraint arrange- 
ments for passenger cars and carbon steel were negotiated in 1981 and 1985- 
86, respectively. The auto VRA covered Japan only, but the steel VRAs ini- 
tially covered nineteen countries and eventually more, nearly all important 
suppliers to the U.S. market. Each had in the background a failed escape- 
clause (Section 201) petition for relief from injury from fair trade. The Intema- 
tional Trade Commission (ITC) turned down a petition for relief from Ford 
and the United Auto Workers in November 1980. Just before the 1984 election, 
President Reagan “turned down” an ITC recommendation for steel relief while 
in the same breath mandating the sweeping VRAs that, from the industry’s 
point of view, were even better. The 1985-86 steel VRAs revised and expanded 
the coverage of VRAs negotiated with the European Community in 1982 after 
the U.S. industry had “delivered to the Commerce Department, on a single day, 
494 boxes containing 3 million pages of documentation for 132 countervailing 
duty  antidumping petitions,  mainly  against  European  exporters”  (Destler 
Unlike the  auto VRAs, the steel VRAs  negotiated target market  shares 
rather than a numerical limit and ultimately included all important suppliers. 
This virtually guarantees cartel-like behavior and closure of some of the more 
obvious VRA-avoidance channels. Auto VRAs ceased to bind in 1987-88, as 
Japanese quality  upgrading and  investment  in  “transplants” in  the  United 
States rebuilt and increased Japanese shares of auto sales without violating the 
trade barrier.32  Steel VRAs, by contrast, were renewed with minor adjustments 
by President Bush in late 1989, but for two and a half years only, instead of 
five, and with a strong verbal commitment to negotiate-multilaterally-their 
complete phaseout in the interim.33 
Machine tool VRAs were negotiated in  1986 after the Commerce Depart- 
ment ruled in  1985 that (fair trade) imports were presenting a threat to U.S. 
national security.34  A 1983 petition on similar grounds had been rejected. Ma- 
1990,23-24). 
3 1. For example, small Japanese auto firms were likely losers from the U.S. voluntary restraint 
arrangements with Japan, in contrast to large firms. On the other hand, the same arrangements 
may have increased entry to the US.  market by Korean and Taiwanese suppliers. 
32. Assessments of the auto VRAs such as those of Collyns and Dunaway (1987) imply that 
US.  consumers paid an extremely high price for temporary protection of the big three US.  firms, 
which went more than originally hoped into higher prices and profits and less into volume, quality, 
employment, and wages. Sources suggest a distinct cooling of congressional support for the big 
three US.  firms toward the end of the 1980s. 
33. These negotiations are linked to the outcome of the Uruguay Round. 
34. Section 232 of the Trade Act of 1962 is the national security route to relief from fair trade. 645  Trade Policy 
chine tool VRAs, like those for steel, set rigid market-share targets for imports. 
Like those for autos, however, they cover only certain suppliers-Japan  and 
Taiwan. Germany and Switzerland explicitly refused to negotiate VRAs, so the 
United States very publicly “monitors” their exports as well as those of other 
suppliers. In this context, monitoring is to free trade roughly what parole is to 
a free ex-convict! 
The  1986 Semiconductor Agreement with Japan was managed trade of  a 
different color and deeper intensity. It consolidated the antidumping petitions 
of U.S. firms like Micron, competing with Japanese chip makers in sales to the 
US. market, and the market-access (Section 301) petitions of U.S. firms like 
Texas Instruments, competing through its Japanese operations with Japanese 
chip makers in sales in Japan (and el~ewhere).~~  In an attempt to please all 
petitioners, the United States leaned on Japan to monitor (raise) its firms’ chip 
prices in the United States and third-country markets and to work to allow U.S. 
firms a 20 percent share of the Japanese chip market by 1991. To the rest of the 
world this looked like classic cartel bullying. Third-country price maintenance/ 
monitoring was for all purposes extraterritorial price fixing, especially heinous 
to countries that were heavy users of chips, but not  Market-share 
insurance in the Japanese chip market was for all purposes preemptive market 
splitting against European and other producers.37  The U.S. defense was that its 
chip makers’ lives were on the line; here, if  anywhere, was a classic case of 
predatory dumping along with predatory denial of market access; U.S. firms 
were the prey. 
Whatever the merits of  this defense, no commentators consider the Semi- 
conductor Agreement a managed-trade success. In  1987, the United States re- 
taliated against Japan for failing to enforce the agreement adequately, with 
some subsequent softening but not removal of the punitive retaliatory tariffs. 
U.S. market share in the Japanese market was in 1990 nowhere near 20 per- 
cent, and extreme volatility has characterized chip prices in Japan and chip 
availability in the United States and other markets. 
In light of the experiments with managed trade, the 1980s closed with sur- 
prisingly supportive sentiment for it. Some, perhaps, springs from declining 
respect for U.S. private-sector management. The perception remains unproved 
and certainly at variance with the strong position of U.S. multinational firms 
in worldwide exports (see Kravis and Lipsey 1985, 1987). Nor does it seem 
convincing that public-sector management has risen in U.S. esteem (consider 
NASA, e.g.). The United States seems particularly ill equipped to embark on 
additional managed-trade experiments. Yet  a strong coalition has formed for 
1991 revision and renewal of the Semiconductor Agreement, and the prospects 
35. For discussion, see Destler (1990, 34-38)  and Prestowitz (1989, chap. 2). 
36. Their situation is why the GAlT insists that only an importer government has the right to 
37. Europe subsequently negotiated its own semiconductor agreement with Japan, in a sort of 
decide whether to levy antidumping duties. 
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for ending steel VRAs in  1992 have been dimmed by  world recession and 
meager outcomes of the Uruguay Round. 
The Turn toward Congressional Activism 
The turn toward congressional activism in U.S. trade policy dates to the 
1970s and even before. But the turn was much sharper during the first Reagan 
administration than at any previous time. Having set a new course, Congress 
turned no further after the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of  1988. 
The decade ended with Congress “back on the board of directors” instead of 
trying to manage trade policy, but committed to a much more active director- 
ship than at any time in the postwar era.38  Among other effects, congressional 
activism has added even more complexity to the traditional multivoice, multi- 
agency, multiconstituency U.S. approach to trade policy. Such complexity can 
indeed breed disarray, but it can also make U.S. government strategy options 
richer, increasing the credibility of threats toward recalcitrant trading partners 
and allowing recourse to good cophad cop tactics. 
Congressional restiveness was aggravated by the deteriorating economic en- 
vironment and the laissez-faire executive branch ideology of the early 1980s. 
Not only were constituents battered by a recession of  record postwar severity, 
but traded-goods sectors and their host region in the industrial heartland were 
devastated by uncompetitive exchange rates and the $125 billion plunge in the 
trade balance, as seen in figures 10.1 and 10.2 above. The export-dependent 
protrade coalition shrank; the import-battered protectionist coalition mush- 
roomed. Administration attacks on the Export-Import Bank and refusal to re- 
new footwear relief seemed wholly wrongheaded on Capitol Hill. Administra- 
tion crowing about the strong dollar (“America is back”) and impenetrability 
to the sectoral fallout from its macroeconomic policy weapons only rubbed 
salt into the perceived wounds of Congress. 
Congress’s first activist reaction was the Trade and Tariff Act of  1984. The 
original version included many protectionist provisions, removed only after 
masterful persuasion by  USTR William Brock, an ex-senator (see Niskanen 
1988, 147-48). Important provisions of the bill that remained were negotiation 
authority for bilateral free trade areas, mandated reporting by USTR on over- 
seas trade barriers, and authorization for USTR to become activist itself, not 
just reactive. Specifically, USTR was given the ability to “self-initiate” Section 
301 negotiations to end unjustifiable, unreasonable, and discriminatory barri- 
ers to U.S. export market access. 
Congress exploded in trade policy activity in early 1985 when the dollar 
soared to its February peak, when the self-initiating 301 still remained dor- 
mant, and when President Reagan nonchalantly agreed to end the auto VRA 
with Japan and transferred Brock to the Labor Department, leaving USTR 
38. As Destler (1986, 1990) documents,  Congress’s desire is generally to have influence on and 
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leaderless for three months (see Destler 1986, 105-7;  and Destler and Henning 
1989, 38-40).39  Senate Republicans, frightened and betrayed by shortcomings 
of  their own leadership and (according to one source) chary of  competitive 
initiative from the House of Representatives, began the process of drafting the 
legislation that became the 1988 Trade Bill. House and Senate Democrats ac- 
tively promoted an import surcharge (an idea originating with Republican Sen- 
ator John Danforth). 
The revolution brought results-the  administration finally heard. Clayton 
Yeutter, the new USTR, promised and began delivering more aggressive words 
and actions. USTR “self-initiated” four 301 cases in August and subsequently 
many more. A Trade Policy Task Force was formed to “seek and destroy” egre- 
gious foreign trade barriers. The Plaza Agreement provided coordinated gov- 
ernment ratification for a weaker, more competitive dollar. 
But the administration had lost the initiative on trade legislation to the Con- 
gress. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of  1988 was three years 
in the making and the first congressionally initiated broad trade legislation 
since Smoot-Hawley in 1930. 
What emerged at the end was an act that more than anything else embodies 
congressional commitment to vigilant monitoring of trade policy, to executive 
branch activism in  pursuing unfair practices and enhancing market access 
abroad,4O and to retaliation if necessary to prompt reluctant trading partners to 
negotiate in good faith (essentially Congress’s “right to strike” if bargaining 
fails). 
What also emerged was authorization for ambitious Uruguay Round negoti- 
ations and a stifling of the cascade of explicitly protectionist legislation enu- 
merated in table 10.6 above. Almost all explicit protection was excised from 
the bill during protracted drafting by both houses, with input from a far more 
pragmatic second Reagan administration, and during the mammoth meetings 
of the 199-member conference c~mmittee.~’ 
Admittedly, the final act contained a contingent arsenal. But almost all the 
most infamous weapons were aimed at trade liberalization. The best known of 
these, the “Super 301 ,” “Special 301 ,” and “Telecom 301” provisions mandate 
USTR designation of trading partners for liberalizing negotiation, with dead- 
lines. Under Super 301, retaliation is mandated only for unjustifiable violations 
of previous trade agreements, not for “unreasonable” or “discriminatory” prac- 
tices. And mandated retaliation can be easily short-circuited by acceptance of 
39. Brock’s transfer was a surprise even to him, according to most sources. It also sent an unsa- 
vory signal to the rest of the world since at that point Brock was the senior trade minister of the 
larger countries. 
40. It was in this spirit that Congress strengthened the USTR’s position in trade policy, insisting 
that she be the president’s chief spokeswoman and adviser on trade, chair all trade policy advisory 
committees to the president, and have the right to attend all meetings where international trade is 
prominently discussed (see USITC 1989, 3). 
41. Whether a leaner, tighter, non-Omnibus bill would have been possible is discussed in the 
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GATT dispute settlement or when it would damage U.S. national security. Sim- 
ilar safety valves exist to avoid mandatory retaliation in other provisions as 
well. 
After two years of  experience, no retaliation seems likely to occur. Even 
India’s refusal to negotiate after its May  1989 and April 1990 namings as a 
priority unfair trader under Super 301 seems likely to be ironed out under 
GATT auspices, as part of Uruguay Round bargaining, rather than prompting 
retaliati~n.~~ 
But the arsenal is not toothless, of course. Significant Korean liberalization 
made it possible to avoid being named under Super 301. Brazilian liberaliza- 
tion saved it from being re-named in  1990 after its  1989 designation. And, 
although Japan refused to negotiate broad practices under Super 301 designa- 
tion, it did consent to negotiate narrowly on wood products, supercomputers, 
and satellites. 
Both the Japanese and the U.S. governments then agreed to assign the broad 
grievances to the face-saving Structural Impediments Initiative, which was ex- 
plicitly decoupled from Section 301 proceedings. There U.S. grievance was 
matched with Japanese grievance, and attempts to exchange mutual remedial 
commitments were the outcome. This innovative device has the feel of “princi- 
pal supplier” practice under conventional tariff multilaterals, but in that light 
it will be important for world trade policy stability to assure that commitments 
are  most-favored-nation (MFN)  equivalent,  not  preferential,  as  discussed 
An important liability of SII, however, is lack of congressional linkage. The 
SII negotiations were not explicitly authorized by Congress. Nor therefore will 
any U.S. implementing legislation to fulfill commitments to Japan be privi- 
leged with  “fast-track” (yay  or nay  without amendment) treatment. In  the 
1990s, congressional activism may come into serious conflict with SII commit- 
ments. 
Managed-trade activists, meanwhile, view the arsenal with hope for a differ- 
ent reason. If it fails to foment liberalization, the ensuing retaliation may be an 
ideal vehicle by which managed-trade activism can attain de facto legitimacy 
in U.S. policy. 
Less prominently noted  in the activist arsenal that Congress created are 
some additional powerful but dangerous weapons: potential scrutiny of foreign 
direct investment in the United States for threat to national security; potential 
denial of MFN extension of Uruguay Round agreements to industrial countries 
42. In fact, if the Uruguay Round succeeds, then unilateral U.S. 301 cases would presumably 
become rarer. Services, investment, and intellectual  property  would all be vested with GATT 
rights, and improved GAP  dispute settlement procedures might substitute for Section 301 initia- 
tives. This is presumably the U.S. carrot or olive branch behind what the rest of the world sees as 
a club. 
43. SII meetings will continue for two years to monitor progress and discuss matters relevant to 
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lacking full reciprocity; potential U.S. government procurement embargoes 
against countries that violate U.S. rights or discriminate against U.S. suppliers 
in their own procurement policy; and potential for a unilateral import sur- 
charge to fund adjustment assistance programs if other countries do not agree 
to negotiate a uniform counterpart.44 
Trading partners have naturally accused the U.S. government of “bullying” 
and “unilateralism.” The emphasis on foreign offenses certainly does seem 
one-sided, but SII-style mutual grievance negotiations may redress that. Other- 
wise, it is not yet clear whether bullying and unilateralism is the right meta- 
phor. Congressional and administration intent seems so far merely to be activ- 
ism, the abandonment of historical passivism, “no more Mr. Nice Guy,” “no 
more unhealthy enabling of foreign addiction to trade policy interventionism.” 
The trade policy environment of the 1990s will no doubt shape the growth of 
the malleable features of the 1988 bill into mature and reasonable adults or 
monsters. A few disciplining features along these lines are discussed below. 
10.2  Roads Not Taken 
U.S. trade policy choices in the 1980s were clearly constrained by the unfa- 
vorable trade policy environments-the  growing perception of unfair foreign 
practices, the macroeconomic decline of the early 1980s and even more endur- 
ing slump in the trade balance, and the ideological ferment of the first Reagan 
administration. 
Yet alternatives were still possible to the choices made, and this section of 
the paper assesses some, starting with alternative strategies, then moving to 
alternative tactics. Among tactics, alternatives to the three important “tilts” in 
U.S. trade policy will be examined, then several tilts not taken (or dogs that 
did not bark). 
10.2.1  Alternative Strategies? 
With respect to trade policy strategy, it is worth repeating that this paper 
takes  the  macroeconomic environment and  its  underlying policy thrust  as 
given. Had early 1980s macroeconomic policy been different, alternative trade 
policy strategies would have been more numerous than they were. Another way 
of saying this is that one of  the most attractive alternative strategies for U.S. 
trade policy would have been a more sensitive appreciation in macroeconomic 
policy for the unhealthy fallout from the soaring dollar.4s  Trade policy’s flanks 
were  left dangerously exposed by  the retreat  of  seasoned macroeconomic 
forces. Trade policy then had to retreat itself, with casualties along the way. 
Given the macroeconomic environment, the first trade policy strategy to 
44. For a detailed discussion of these and other provisions, see USITC (1989, 1-9). 
45. For an extensive account of why early and frequent expressions of this view carried so little 
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consider might be called “multilateral diversion.” Multilateral diversion is a 
long-standing US.  practice, involving more-or-less continuous rounds of mul- 
tilateral trade negotiations that divert and delay the ever-present pressures for 
protection and promotion. Congress and the president can channel such pres- 
sures into the multilateral agenda and urge patience on petitioners “until the 
results of the round are in.” The premise behind this strategy is captured by the 
familiar bicycle metaphor. If  the bicycle of  trade liberalization isn’t  moving 
forward continuously, it will fall victim to the gravity of protection. 
In essence, multilateral diversion was the strategy of USTR Brock in 1981. 
But, for reasons described above, it failed and was replaced by eclectic tactics: 
“multilateral if possible; minilateral if necessary.” To have continued to press 
along traditional lines after the GATT ministerial meetings of 1982 would have 
been politically suicidal, within the administration, in the eyes of  Congress, 
and in public opinion. 
The second alternative trade policy is the inverse of the first and might be 
called consistency and insulation. Consistency implies common approaches to 
trade policy petitions and cases, presumably by following U.S. administrative 
remedies closely. It could have been couched in the rhetoric of law and order 
in trade policy. Insulation implies ignoring GATT multilaterals and dispute 
settlement until more auspicious environments emerge than those of the early 
198Osj6  It is hard, however, to see that strategy dominating the tactical pragma- 
tism actually practiced. Consistently might have implied the administration 
accepting more petitions (e.g., the escape-clause petitions of footwear in 1981 
and copper in  1985) and pressing others to their logical conclusion (e.g., the 
massive number of  steel petitions against dumping and subsidies in  1982). 
Although Congress might have been placated by such a strategy, trading part- 
ners in the recession of  1981-83  would almost surely have seen such rigidity 
as Smoot-Hawley revisited and retaliated (e.g., the EC in steel). 
In the later 1980s, sectoral minilateralism is a third strategy that might have 
given the U.S. executive an initiative independent of Congress. Especially in 
the cases of steel and semiconductor chips, the U.S. government might have 
been instrumental in activating liberalizing negotiations among principal sup- 
plier~?~  Given the issues involved in steel, the signatories of the Tokyo Round 
Subsidies Code might have been the logical charter group and, for parallel 
reasons, signatories of  the Anti-dumping Code for chips. Such negotiations 
would of course have been GATT related, but also distinct in the same way the 
codes are distinct from the GATT. Naturally, such sectoral minilaterals could 
have been brought under the umbrella of  a subsequent Uruguay Round, but 
46. At least one source thought that the US.  initiative for a 1982 GAm  ministerial was unwise, 
but it is not clear whether he would have thought so without hindsight, e.g., early in 1981 when 
the initiative was planned. 
47. The Bush administration illustrated the application of this strategy in its approach to ship- 
building in 1989, convincing U.S.  shipbuilders to withdraw a Section 301 complaint and pressing 
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prior to that might have served to hold back the cartelizing forces of compre- 
hensive steel VRAs and special semiconductor deals among big-country sup- 
pliers. The danger in this alternative is that liberalizing negotiations would 
become perverted by  narrowly  sectoral interests, and the results would be 
“MFAs for steel and chips”48  instead of orderly progress toward market out- 
comes. 
Finally, as a fourth alternative to the late 1980s Uruguay Round thrust, the 
maxi-minilateral strategy of negotiating an OECD Free Trade and Investment 
Area is worth consideration (see Hufbauer 1989, chap. 7). Proponents favored 
expansion of the negotiations to include a few prominent NICs and coverage 
that would have been just as comprehensive as the Uruguay Round-services, 
investment, dispute settlement. Proponents argued that the risk of failure would 
be less, as would temptations for accelerated U.S. “unilateralism.” 
This alternative strategy looks uncompelling at this time. Proponents did not 
anticipate the destructive importance of agriculture and services issues in the 
Uruguay Round negotiations-issues  that would have splintered the OECD 
initiative as well. At least the Uruguay Round has succeeded (however tempes- 
tuously) at provoking the active initiative of  the  developing countries that 
would have been isolated under the OECD-centered proposal. So far there has 
been no acceleration of U.S. unilateralism, despite the doubtful prospects for 
the round. The OECD approach would probably have fared no better. 
10.2.2  Alternative Tactics? 
Beyond  alternative trade policy  strategies, were there tactical roads not 
taken? For sound reason or not? 
Alternatives to Minilateralism ? 
US. minilateral tactics in the 1980s elicited considerable hand~ringing.~~ 
Regional liberalization has been alleged to undermine the GATT, and “griev- 
ance minilaterals” have been dismissed as unilateral bullying. Handwringing 
notwithstanding, the Uruguay Round was launched, and the United States has 
conducted its grievance initiatives judiciously and with retaliation only in the 
Semiconductor Agreement. Furthermore, many of  its Section 301  initiatives 
have had the flavor of the long-respected tradition of a principal supplier bar- 
gaining bilaterally with a principal demander, only often on issues not explic- 
itly covered by the GATT. 
These observations suggest a supplementation of  the U.S.  approach that 
might be considered an alternative tactic. It would be to add MFN-equivalent 
application to all U.S. grievance minilaterals so that market-opening conces- 
sions would be made clearly available to all potential suppliers, not just to the 
48. The phrase is Robert E. Baldwin’s. 
49. See, e.g.,  the contributions by Isaiah Frank, Anne 0.  Krueger, Gardner Patterson, and Martin 
Wolf to Schott (1989) and also Bhagwati (1988, 1989). 652  J. David Richardson 
U.S. principals. Although this has been the U.S. practice in most cases, there 
have been exceptions, such as the late  1980s negotiation of access for U.S. 
firms alone to the Korean insurance market.s0 
Otherwise, grievance minilaterals between principal suppliers and demand- 
ers have the familiar advantages of  involving the parties with the strongest 
commitment and, presumably, the best information. Bilateral approaches may 
often in fact be the most feasible approaches for complex new issues in ser- 
vices and foreign investment measures, involving sensitive cultural and insti- 
tutional issues. That is, for example, why most tax treaties are bilateral, not 
multilateral. 
Given the environment of the 1980s, it is hard to imagine other alternatives 
to minilateralism that would have maintained liberalizing impetus. This is not 
true of alternatives to the sharper of the U.S. turns toward managed trade. 
Alternatives to Managed Trade? 
One obvious alternative to the milder U.S. tilts toward managed trade would 
have been sanctioned administrative remedies. VRAs with Japan on autos, for 
example, could have been avoided by the introduction of legislation that altered 
the way the International Trade Commission defined substantial cause of seri- 
ous injury. The auto industry  could then  presumably  have resubmitted  an 
escape-clause petition. In the event, the alternative to the auto VRA was a strict 
quota bill introduced by  Senators John Danforth (R) and Lloyd Bentsen (D) 
that would presumably have attracted significant congressional support. Unlike 
the VRA, it might still be rigidly protecting U.S. automakers today. 
Similarly for machine tools, temporary import relief could have been pro- 
vided in principle on the statutory grounds that imports were threatening na- 
tional security. Yet relief to a manufacturing industry on these grounds would 
have been unprecedented (oil had received such relief in the 1970s), and the 
persuasiveness of the case had already been undermined by its rejection three 
years previously. Since Germany and Switzerland would presumably have been 
unable to avoid barriers to their exports in this case, a GATT appeal and/or 
retaliation might well have been the result. 
Yet, in the cases of both autos and machine tools, it is arguable that the mild, 
noncomprehensive VRAs supplied roughly  the amount of  temporary  relief 
(until circumvented),5' with compensation, that escape-clause or national secu- 
rity relief would have supplied. Thus, alternative tactics may boil down to es- 
sentially the same thing-except,  of course, that the one chosen is at or beyond 
the fringe of accepted rules. 
50. One commentator observed how tempting it is for the target country to offer a preferential 
concession only, which would be adequately valuable to the complaining country but not as costly 
for the target as an MFN-equivalent concession. 
51. US. machine tool imports were 10 percent higher in 1988 than in 1986 as increased ship- 
ments from noncontrolled sources more than compensated for reduced shipments from Japan and 
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By  contrast, the more aggressive managed-trade experiments in steel and 
semiconductors had arguable stronger anticompetitive effects. Here, most of 
the sanctioned administrative remedies were probably not feasible alternatives. 
Although steel could have been awarded escape-clause relief, any levying of 
significant antidumping and countervailing duties would likely have elicited 
European appeal to the GATT and/or retaliation. And semiconductor petition- 
ers were divided between those who wanted protection in the U.S. market and 
those who wanted access to the Japanese market, with each potentially injured 
by the other’s relief.52 
Here a sensible alternative might have been sectoral minilateralism, as de- 
scribed above, and as George Bush essentially promised in his 1989 renewal 
of the steel VRAs for only two and a half years. In semiconductor chips, this 
would merely have involved inviting the EC, and perhaps Korea, to join the 
negotiations that the United States and Japan were carrying out anyway. 
Alternatives to Congressional Activism? 
Could there have been a kinder, gentler Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness 
Act of  1988? a leaner but not so mean nonomnibus act that would still have 
authorized Uruguay Round negotiations? 
These questions are hard to answer because the effects of  the 1988 act on 
US.  trade policy are still not clear. In its short-run impact, the act has both 
enabled the Uruguay Round to proceed and provoked significant liberalization 
and promises of more from Brazil, Korea, Japan, and other countries. But the 
efficacy of the act’s provisions in the medium and long run are not so clear. 
The Uruguay Round may deliver far less than it promised, if anything at all. 
And, after easy conquests of obvious inequities, the search for priority unfair 
practices and traders may provoke only acrimony and retaliation. 
It seems likely that, if the Reagan administration had become activist a year 
or so earlier, it could have preempted congressional activism in trade legisla- 
ti~n.~’  This would almost surely have produced a bill with more discretion and 
fewer mandated reports and deadlines. But it would still have been tough and 
possibly  not as effective in encouraging concessions from trading partners. 
Congress is a better “bad cop” than any part of the executive branch. 
Also, if the Reagan U.S. had initiated trade legislation sooner, it might have 
resulted in a slightly leaner bill because it would have choked off the “y’all 
come” flavor of congressional initiative.54  But, in the late 1980s, there is almost 
no way to avoid the involvement of myriads of committees and subcommittees 
52. Micron might have been disadvantaged by any competitive scalekost advantage that Texas 
Instruments acquired by increasing its chip sales in Japan. 
53. The administration did not submit its own draft of a trade bill until 1987, and it was then 
virtually ignored by  a Congress intent on drafting its own, according to one source, who said, 
“They never opened the envelope.” 
54. One source reports being called by  the chairman of a congressional committee, who said, 
“Every time there’s  a trade bill we pass; this time we want to play.” The result was ultimately 
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since the ambitious Uruguay Round agenda touches on the regulatory domain 
of virtually all. 
Tilts Not Taken? 
It is easy to forget several tactical tilts that were briefly considered, then 
resisted. Among these the most important were domestic content and import 
quota bills to protect the U.S. auto industry in the early 1980s; import quota 
bills to protect textiles, apparel, and footwear in the late  1980s; the import 
surcharge bill of 1985; and the proposal from the early 1980s to merge USTR 
and the Commerce Department into a Department of International Trade and 
Industry (DITI). 
Each of these had the potential to become a significant and self-perpetuating 
shift in U.S. trade policy. The first two would have extended the scope of “spe- 
cial protection” beyond fibers and steel to autos and footwear, each a large U.S. 
industry in output and employment. The first was short-circuited by the auto 
VRAs, and the second was  suppressed by  presidential vetoes. A tilt toward 
explicit protectionism was consequently avoided, a tilt that would arguably 
have been as significant as minilateralism, managed trade, and congressional 
activism. 
The thrust for an import surcharge was blunted by  the Reagan administra- 
tion’s  1985 concessions, then essentially transformed to emerge as the Super 
301 provision of the 1988 trade bill. Had the surcharge passed in its original 
form, it would have levied extra duties up to 25 percent on imports from part- 
ners with large trade surpluses. This might have made the Uruguay Round 
inconceivable and most likely would have delayed it. It would clearly have 
been an explicit violation of GATT tariff bindings and the most-favored-nation 
principle. Thus, it could have been interpreted as virtual abandonment of the 
GATT by the United States.55 
Finally, had the United States weakened the multiagency tradition in trade 
policy and consolidated its administration under the DITI, this would almost 
certainly  have  accentuated  the  tilt  toward  managed  trade  and  given  that 
tilt more momentum than in fact it had in the late 1980s. Almost surely the 
tilt  would  have been  so great that  it  would be  better  described as a turn 
toward industrial policy, a resurgence of  Hamiltonian perspectives from the 
U.S. past! 
With due allowance then for these tilts not taken, one might assess U.S. trade 
policy in the 1980s by saying that the traditional boat rocked, but did not cap- 
size. I turn in the last section of  the paper to a slightly more detailed as- 
sessment. 
55. Unlike the U.S. import surcharge of  1971, it could not have been defended as a desperate, 
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10.3  Effects and Assessment 
US.  trade policy in the 1980s seems on balance to have become mildly more 
restrictive. It has almost surely contributed to the stagnation in the ratio of U.S. 
trade to output, relative to its 1970s surge, and relative to the ongoing growth 
in the ratio for the world as a whole (see GATT 1989, 8). The future effects of 
particular turns and tilts of U.S. trade policy, however, vary 
Minilateral initiatives seem likely to continue and have the potential for ef- 
fective liberalization. Regional liberalization is, on the basis of empirical eval- 
uation, at least somewhat liberalizing. Trade war (as opposed to competition) 
among rival blocs seems possible in the name of  economic security, yet un- 
likely. “Forced” bilateral and minilateral negotiations have the potential to be 
no more severe or undesirable than “forced” confrontation in any setting. 
Managed-trade initiatives are more mixed. Mild, limited voluntary restraint 
arrangements have always come and gone on the international trading scene.56 
Their metastasis into MFA-like complexity is the exception, not the rule. But 
steel VRAs are not reassuring and may be the next exception. In general, there 
seems to be undue alarm over mild VRAs and undue nonchalance over the 
anticompetitive effects of sweeping managed-trade initiatives. 
Trade policy activism on the part of the U.S. Congress and the executive 
branch will have uncertain outcomes, it seems. Like an arsenal of weapons, it 
can either keep the peace or terrorize. Much depends on who is in command. 
On balance, then, of the three important turns in U.S. trade policy in the 
1980s, one seems to have liberalizing potential, and the other two draw mixed 
assessments. In an economically healthy future, this nets to a mildly positive 
assessment and might ultimately be judged even more enthusiastically. If the 
1990s environment, however, turns out to be unhealthy, then the dark potential 
of managed trade and congressional activism may overwhelm any positive as- 
pects of minilateralism. 
One alarming legacy of U.S. and European trade policy in the 1970s and the 
1980s is the preoccupation with unfair practices and remedies. This has all 
the debilitating aspects of older “divorce for abuse only” cases, emphasizing 
the adversarial relationship and casting one part as devil and the other as angel. 
More promising, perhaps, is the cooler approach that deemphasizes conflict 
and reemphasizes the need for adjustment and potential for mutual gains from 
trade through negotiation over the policy skeletons that every government has 
in its closet. More promising perhaps is a road that traverses communication, 
then  mediation, then,  as  a  last resort,  “no-fault divorce” when  necessary. 
The trick is how  to shape international institutions and domestic policies to 
56. For an engaging history of how frequently these devices were used even in the “good old 
days” of GA?T  preeminence, see Patterson (1966). 656  J. David Richardson 
these ends in an environment increasingly given to seeing selling and buying 
as a species of  war and “economic security” as an end above economic pros- 
perity. 
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Considerations of domestic politics were rarely absent from trade policy de- 
bates, but they were not always controlling factors in reaching decisions; nor 
was the “threat” of strict enforcement of U.S. trade laws, or ideology, the com- 
pelling element. Sometimes it was one of  these factors, sometimes another; 
but most often, it will surprise no one, a combination of all three determined 
the result. 
What follows are some anecdotes about trade policy decisions with respect 
to steel, automobiles, export controls, and semiconductors. To my recollection, 
in none of these instances did any commitment to free trade principles appear 
to control the outcome. ‘‘Compromise’’-between  ideals and politics, often 
despite the economic analysis, or what common sense dictated, or obligations 
that existed under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)-was 
the motive force that shaped decisions. Whether this was good or bad, effective 
or a failure, is, I suppose, about to be debated during this conference. And that 
makes it all the more worthwhile to be here. 
My earliest recollection of how trade policy was formed in the first Reagan 
administration goes back to the beginning of  198 1. As the new undersecretary 
for international trade in the Department of Commerce, a position created in 659  Trade Policy 
1979 and occupied by  a Democratic appointee for a brief nine months, I had 
resolved  quickly  to  review  the  matters  within  my  responsibility  and  to 
straighten out several areas that I perceived needed attention. 
First were antidumping and countervailing duty cases, functions only re- 
cently transferred from the Treasury Department (where they had historically 
resided until shifted to Commerce over the objection of the administration by 
the same act of Congress that created the undersecretary position). Petitions 
were not being processed within statutory time frames, and the US.  business 
community made clear its dissatisfaction with the “foreign bias” in Treasury’s 
processing of cases. 
Second, controls on exports of civilian products and technology that could 
have military applications were excessive, and the policy seemed driven by the 
Pentagon’s desire to  impose  economic hardship  on the  Soviet Union, the 
Eastern-bloc countries, and the People’s Republic of China rather than to re- 
strain the development of  modern weapons systems. Ironically, the policy 
penalized  American  businessmen, alienated  many  of  our  friendly trading 
partners, and affected the Communist nations’ military capabilities only mar- 
ginally. 
Third, the antiboycott law,  which makes it a crime (in addition to a civil 
offense) to aid in the creation or maintenance of “secondary and tertiary” boy- 
cotts, had the U.S. businessman in a painful dilemma, sorely disadvantaged 
relative to his foreign competition and unable to get straight answers about or 
know in advance what the U.S.  government’s policy was. Even the provision 
of  publicly held information, such as an annual report, could be deemed a 
response to a “boycott-related request” and subject a company to severe pen- 
alties. 
Fourth, trade policy with Japan did not take account of what I believe should 
have been obvious to government officials: most important was Japan’s com- 
pact with its private sector to become preeminent in high-technology indus- 
tries, together with a pattern of excluding imports and any sizable foreign mar- 
ket presence. 
Finally, there were over 2,000 civil servants employed by Commerce to pro- 
mote exports who were based in forty-seven cities in the United States and 
about a hundred countries. They were unfocused, inadequately compensated, 
and, especially abroad, ordinarily had to function under the disdainful eye of 
U.S. embassy staff that little valued commercial work. Even with access to key 
foreign government officials and businessmen internationally and domesti- 
cally, their utility was being hamstrung by Washington politics. 
So there was a lot of work to be done, and, as I set out, I did not think in 
terms of “protectionism” or “free trade.” I preferred characterizing the process 
as simply sensible and fair. To  the extent possible, I believed that we should 
get the system of international rules to work effectively. To the extent that this 
was not possible, I thought that we should not shrink from intervening unilater- 
ally. In the abstract, this approach met with no visible criticism from within 
the administration and with widespread approval by  the private sector, from 660  Lionel H. Olmer 
which I had just emerged. When applied in specific instances, however, I and 
the Commerce Department often became embroiled in controversy, sometimes 
savaged in the media and viewed by  some elements of the administration as 
impediments to Reaganonomics. 
One of the earliest decisions made by the new administration was to end the 
trigger-price mechanism (TPM). The TPM was the Carter administration’s  way 
of dealing with the U.S. steel industry’s complaints of foreign dumping and 
government subsidization. Rather than impose duty penalties or quotas on im- 
ported steel, the TPM’s approach was to have the Treasury Department (later 
the Commerce Department) calculate who was the world’s low-cost producer 
and publicize the per ton landed price to the rest of the world’s producers, who 
were told that so long as they sold above that level they would not be in danger 
of any unfair trade complaint being filed against them. 
I became persuaded that the TPM was simply not working, that it was being 
circumvented easily by  several foreign companies (with criminal fraud later 
proved against a few), and that the American companies-who  had consented 
to withdraw unfair trade petitions in return for the TPM-were  being victim- 
ized. Free trade ideology was not the basis for the decision to do away with 
the TPM, inasmuch as six months later we instituted an equally complicated, 
interventionist pact with the European Community (EC) that set precise quotas 
on a dozen or so products from the twelve member states. 
In my mind, the TPM was a perfect example of the government attempting 
what it was not well equipped to do: to be effective, TPM would have required 
an army of trained, knowledgeable staff to monitor and enforce the program 
from hearth to end user. This, clearly, the government was not prepared to un- 
dertake. 
What we promised the industry as an alternative to TPM was “strict enforce- 
ment of U.S. trade laws.” Steel industry leaders were skeptical, to say the least, 
but, because they knew the system was not working, and with the goodwill and 
credibility that attaches to the beginning of  a new  administration, the indus- 
try went along. Additionally, I must also say, Secretary of  Commerce Mal- 
colm Baldrige had enormous credibility with the U.S. business community, 
from which he had only recently come, and with the steel industry in partic- 
ular. 
Well, we had our shot at totally unregulated steel trade, and it lasted roughly 
half a year. Overcapacity in Europe, most of it built with government funds, 
resulted in a huge surge of  exports to the United States sold at prices that 
could not be matched by domestic companies. The companies were back with 
their trade cases ready to file again, and we knew that under US. law very 
severe dumping and countervailing duties were likely to be imposed. To follow 
our maxim of “strict enforcement” would have brought down governments in 
Europe because the EC’s industrial policy openly acknowledged the payout of 
millions of dollars to inefficient steelmakers and the penalties would cripple 
their export prospects. So we  negotiated a settlement of  cases with the EC, 661  Trade Policy 
giving it a percentage of  our market, looked knowingly at Japan as if to say, 
“Don’t dare take advantage of the absence of formal restraints with you,”  and 
kept our fingers crossed about the rest of the world. The White House and most 
others in the administration were opposed to the settlement-low  regard for 
the steel industry probably was at the root of this attitude as much as was free 
trade ideology. 
Congress played an enthusiastic role, but, despite the threat of  legislated 
quotas, its influence was not dominant. There were several White House meet- 
ings with the president and members of the “Congressional Steel Caucus,” and 
they encouraged the tilt toward a negotiated restraint agreement, but the dis- 
positive element was the fact that our trade laws would severely disrupt U.S. 
relations with its most important allies. 
Was this an example of protectionism? And, if so, would the free trade ideo- 
logues have preferred “strict enforcement of  trade laws” whatever the conse- 
quences? 
Actually, not only did the ideologues not want intervention, but they did not 
think much of U.S. trade laws or the means by which Commerce administered 
them! Indeed, early on, a proposal was briefly floated, very informally I might 
add, that the secretary should review unfair trade cases with an interagency 
group before taking final decisions. This suggestion was summarily dismissed 
and never appeared again. 
Stuck with the law being the law  and a secretary who would not tolerate 
encroachment, this deal with the EC was the best that could be achieved. And, 
because of  the foreign policy implications, the State Department breathed a 
sigh of relief and lent encouragement to our efforts to gain administration ac- 
quiescence. 
Of  course, lines were drawn in the sand between the “black hats” and the 
“white hats” months before on the subject of automobiles. The decision to 
force the Japanese government “voluntarily” to impose mandatory quotas on 
its automobile industry was justified as an essential but temporary measure to 
give Detroit time (two years, with an option to renew for an additional third 
year) to “retool and become competitive.” Whether this was a sincere belief 
held by  anyone in the administration or the Congress, where a quota bill had 
been introduced on 5 February 1981, is debatable. The fact is that political 
pressures from the Hill, the industry, and organized labor were substantial, no 
one expressed any sympathy for what this might do to Japanese industry, and 
neither the bona fides nor the competence of Detroit was challenged with any 
discipline. 
Domestic politics was everything in this  calculus, with barely a passing 
glance as to the implications that a quota arrangement would have for the ad- 
ministration’s trade policy during the next three and a half years. The restraint 
was imposed despite the absence of evidence of unfair trade or  injury to the 
industry by reason of imports. Indeed, in 1980, the International Trade Com- 
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primarily from the recession, its failure to shift production to smaller cars, and 
a public perception of poor quality. 
My personal view, argued at the time with no success, was that restraints at 
the levels being discussed (1.68 million passenger cars) were not sufficiently 
low to make a large enough difference to Detroit and that the U.S. industry’s 
claim that “two to three years was adequate to retool” rang hollow. Thus, I felt 
that we might have to pay a high price to the Japanese to get them to accede to 
our desires, in exchange for a decision that would not prove effective. Frankly, 
the weight of politics was so substantial as to quash the few who argued that a 
voluntary restraint agreement should be rejected on principle. 
What to do about trade and competitiveness in high-technology products 
was an issue that involved politics, ideology, and U.S. trade laws. Moreover, 
in one respect or another, the Soviet Union, Communist China, Europe, and 
especially Japan were central to the development of  these policies and were 
directly affected by the decisions that were taken or avoided. 
The Soviet Union, China, and the European Community each had griev- 
ances against U.S. regulations and policies regarding technology transfer that 
served to limit the character and quantity of exports. Such policies hindered not 
merely East-West trade; because of the ingenious device known as “reexport 
controls,” virtually every  single destination, worldwide,  became fair game 
since recipients of  U.S. goods or technology had to keep informed of our re- 
strictions and to abide by them before transferring the products elsewhere. In- 
deed, statistically, trade with friendly nations was affected by several orders of 
magnitude greater than was trade with Communist countries. 
For years, the Pentagon’s  ideology prevented change except at the margin, 
despite overwhelming evidence that our policies hurt us more than they did the 
Soviets. Objections from our Western European allies were like cries in the 
wilderness. Sustained criticism from the business community was also of no 
avail. (Even today as we speak, as a matter of  fact, negotiations in Paris be- 
tween the United States and other members of  the Coordinating Committee 
(COCOM) are almost as fractious as they were when the Soviet Union was 
characterized as the evil empire.) Changes did take place, to be sure, but only 
grudgingly, sparingly, and at a pace totally at odds with the growth and wide- 
spread availability of modern technology. Why? 
My answer is that there was (and is) no single official responsible for tech- 
nology transfer policy and that the issues are too voluminous and complicated 
to be “coordinated” in the White House. (Recently, a senior Defense Depart- 
ment official answered congressional criticism that President Bush’s policy 
was not being implemented by responding on the record to the effect that “the 
President does not speak for the Pentagon.”) Given the existing organization, 
and absent some truly overwhelming external motivations, policies regarding 
technology transfer are unlikely ever to be a seamless, rational web. 
If  “tech transfer” is too complicated for politicians, the determination of 
U.S. trade policy toward Japan is certainly too intricate for them, the business 663  Trade Policy 
community, or, forgive me,  economists. But  it does have to  be  made-or 
does it? 
Almost from the beginning of  the first Reagan administration, those who 
argued that Japan was “different” and needed to be dealt with differently from 
other trading partners were labeled black hats, protectionists, and worse. Stud- 
ies that revealed the extent to which U.S. technology leadership was lost or 
threatened were rejected as superficially based on market-share analysis and 
as transparent justification for the injection of  government subsidization to 
compensate for what U.S. industry had failed to do for itself (see tables 10.7 
and  10.8). In  addition to the resistance of  economists and ideologues, the 
grandest consideration of all, foreign policy, added further weight to the white 
hats of trade policy with respect to dealing with Japan. 
Why and how did it change so drastically as to inspire the administration in 
1986 to create a worldwide price cartel for semiconductors in the name of 
achieving fair trade with Japan? In largest part because the Commerce Depart- 
ment and the US. Trade Representative’s Office had found the means of hold- 
ing virtually everyone else in the administration at bay, through determinations 
of incredibly large dumping penalties against several Japanese semiconductor 
manufacturers and the existence of barriers to entry of American products. The 
alternative to the imposition of 150 percent duties in some cases, and the label- 
ing of Japan as an unfair trading nation, was an agreement signed between the 
Table 10.7  MITI  Assessment of U.S.  and Japanese Technology (comparative standings) 
1983  1988 
Technology  Technology 
Technology  Capability  Technology  Capability 
Level of  Development  Level of  Development 
Data base  U.S.  U.S.  U.S.  us 
Semiconductor memory devices  Equal  Equal  Japan  Japan 
Computers  us.  Equal  Equal  Equal 
VCRs  Japan  Japan  Japan  Japan 










Advanced composite materials 
Fine ceramics 
Equal  Equal  Equal  Japan 
us.  Equal  Equal  Japan 

















Equal  Japan 
Equal  Japan 
Equal  Equal 
Japan  Japan 
U.S.  Equal 
Equal  Equal 
Equal  Equal 
Japan  Japan 
Source: MITI Trends and Future Tasks in Industrial Technology (1988). White Paper. 664  Lionel H. Olmer 
Table 10.8  Declining U.S. Market Share in Technology-Based Industries (% of 
World Market) 








16.2  14.2  11.1  11.6 
27.0  20.6  26.1  23.2 
17.6  18.2  12.5  6.1 
N.A.  73.0  59.2  41.9 
N.A.  60.0  49.0  36.0 
95.8  55.6  35.0  20.0 
N.A.  100.0  80.0  76.0 
Source: Council on Competitiveness analysis of U.S. government and industry data. 
Note: With the exception of DRAM, figures represent production in the United States as a percent- 
age of  world production.  DRAM figures represent  production  of companies  headquartered  in 
North America  as a percentage  of world production. Fiber optic, semiconductor, DRAM, and 
supercomputer  figures do not include the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc in total world market. 
N.A. = not available. 
two governments by  which Japanese prices would be raised above levels that 
were to be set by the Commerce Department, quarterly, derived from on-site 
audits of the Japanese companies and their confidential records. The so-called 
fair market value, or floor price, as some preferred to call it, led to an immedi- 
ate rise from $2.00 to $7.00 per chip. 
Far from enhancing the competitiveness of U.S. manufacturers or punishing 
the Japanese, the agreement resulted in huge windfall profits for the latter 
(which has since been invested in even more modem plant facilities), increased 
costs for users of semiconductors such as the automobile, telecommunications, 
and computer industries, and the further reduction of worldwide market share 
in this sector for U.S. companies. 
Would a more sympathetic policy toward high-tech and a tougher policy 
toward Japan earlier in the administration, a recognition that semiconductors 
are critically important to all technology-sensitive industries, have led to a dif- 
ferent approach? My answer is maybe. Consider the following, in which the 
availability of “trade cases” with which to punish Japan and the 1986 decision 
on semiconductors are set in a larger context: 
(a)  The “competitiveness” craze had exploded on the Washington scene, and 
almost everyone wanted to be included in the debate and to appear helpful and 
concerned. Of  course, Capitol Hill urged an industrial policy aimed at high 
technology in particular, while the administration deflected anything with a 
budgetary impact and volunteered strong rhetorical support. 
(b)  Rhetoric was not enough to restrain the body politic or U.S. industry. In 
fact, this was seen as a lack of  empathy, and it enraged a broad spectrum 
of legislators and industry. This industry possessed enormous appeal, and its 
leadership without question represented the “best” that America had to offer 
in terms of scientific genius and entrepreneurial spirit. 665  Trade Policy 
(c) The uniqueness of semiconductors was recognized by government and 
manifested very clearly by the passage of the Semiconductor Chip Protection 
Act of 1984, a sui generis acknowledgement of the intellectual property rights 
inherent in the semiconductor design process. 
(d)  Japan was moving forward swiftly to replace the United States as the 
technology leader in the world; the National Science Foundation, a number of 
universities, and the publications emanating from Japan itself testified to this 
reality. It was simply no longer supportable to maintain that “market forces” 
could be relied on to reverse these trends. 
(e)  Japan’s trade surplus with the United States had ballooned to $50+ bil- 
lion dollars, and, because it resisted changing its import-restricting policies 
until forced, few voices rose to its defense. 
Perhaps there was no realistic alternatives to the taking of strong measures 
against Japan, given the trade cases. Certainly, the administration was not pre- 
pared to launch a major industrial policy, as some Democratic forces urged. 
Yet  it should have been possible to avoid a price cartel! (As it happens, the 
agreement with Japan expires next year, and, although significant modifica- 
tions are being sought that would eliminate the price-fixing component, the 
U.S. high-tech community-joined  [silently] by the Japanese companies who 
have profited more than anyone-is  petitioning the administration to extend a 
number of its basic elements.) 
For some time, the contemporary nature of international business, particu- 
larly manufacturing and especially the high-tech sector, has not been well un- 
derstood by  government officials. The degree to which U.S. imports derive 
from U.S. companies abroad or from U.S.-based subsidiaries of foreign corpo- 
rations has largely escaped attention. In 1987, for example, the combination 
of  these two categories amounted to nearly two-thirds of total U.S. imports. 
Nowhere is this growing trend more evident than in semiconductors and high- 
technology products generally. In 1985, when the U.S. industry supported the 
elimination of all tariffs on semiconductors trade with Japan, it did so, not in 
an ideological pursuit of  free trade (as some in the administration seemed to 
believe), but because such an agreement would permit duty-free imports by 
U.S. companies from their foreign affiliates everywhere (since the agreement 
extended duty-free treatment to all countries on a most-favored-nation basis). 
Next time around, and, it is to be hoped, before the administration commits 
itself, the new realities of  international trade will be better understood, and 
concern for our high-tech future will not prove synonymous with establishment 
of worldwide cartels. But the making of trade policy is unlikely ever to be free 
of politics or consideration of U.S. foreign relations. 666  Paula Stern 
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Congress, the executive branch, and the U.S. International Trade Commission 
each play a role in shaping trade policy in our political system. Presidential 
leadership, however, is critical if  the United States is to continue on the path 
of  trade liberalization chartered in the  1930s and prevent domestic interest 
groups from taking over the trade policy process.’ Using this criterion as a 
measure of success, the Reagan administration’s trade policy deserves very low 
marks.2  Notwithstanding free trade rhetoric, Ronald Reagan-currying  politi- 
cal favor-was  the most protectionist president since Herbert Hoo~er.~ 
By pursuing a macroeconomic  mix of a loose fiscal policy and a tight mone- 
tary policy and ignoring the exchange rate effects of its macroeconomic poli- 
cies in its first term, the Reagan administration generated unprecedented pres- 
sures for protection and responded to the pressures to the same degree. By 
treating only the trade symptoms with import protection, it pushed off the day 
that critics would squarely address the source of much of the problem and lost 
the chance to tackle the necessary sectoral adjustment challenges that lingered. 
Eventually, the day came in the second term to deal with the overvalued dollar. 
The Plaza Agreement of  22 September 1985 was  a major departure in  ex- 
1. See historical discussion in Goldstein and Lenway (1989, 309). Specifically, they state, “In 
the mid-twentieth century, however, many congressional representatives and other policy-makers 
concluded that tariffs should no longer be used to shelter American industry from market forces. 
In  1934 when Congress surrendered its tariff-making authority, there was no consensus among 
congressmen that liberalization was necessary for the U.S. There was no recognition that overly 
protective tariffs had caused the Depression and therefore no longer served the nation’s interests. 
Over the next two decades, however, both parties came to accept the view that lower trade barriers 
had brought prosperity to the U.S. Eisenhower, the first Republican President since Hoover, aban- 
doned the traditional party position favoring high tariffs and accepted liberalization as a necessary 
component of foreign and domestic policy. This consensus about the validity of liberal trade prin- 
ciples and the inability of Congress to deal directly with constituent pressures led to the creation 
of rules and norms, our parametric variables, which define the more or less unquestioned context 
in which protectionism is debated and undertaken.” 
2. Keen academic observers of both Congress and the president have emphasized the predomi- 
nant role that the president plays in influencing the outcome of sector-specific requests for protec- 
tion. Goldstein and Lenway make this observation: “Our analysis further indicates that although 
presidents  do not  appear influential in our regression equations, they may ultimately be more 
important than the Congress in deciding which industries actually receive aid. Presidents have the 
power to modify and reject ITC decisions, and as noted above, they have regularly asserted their 
authority to overrule the ITC on decisions to protect industry. Even in cases in which the President 
agrees to accept the ITC’s finding of injury, he often modifies the specific remedy. Further, the 
President has political  influence, albeit indirect,  through the appointment process. Presidential 
actions, however, are not reducible to partisan politics. Both Democratic and Republican presi- 
dents have used this power; all have favored free trade over protectionism. In short, variation in 
the use of presidential prerogatives appears not to be a function of party politics” (1989, 323). 
3. According to Hufbauer, Berliner, and Elliot (1986, 20) “special protection”  in the United 
States increased from 8 percent in  1975 to 22 percent in  1986. Correspondence between Gary 
Hufbauer and the author updates the figures through  1986. Hufbauer, Berliner, and Elliot define 
“special protection” as “exceptional restraints on imports, implemented through high tariffs, quota 
restraints, or other limitations that go well beyond normal tariff or border restrictions” (1986, 2). 667  Trade Policy 
change rate policy. However, by  showing little leadership in trade and adjust- 
ment policy throughout the decade, the Reagan administration never effec- 
tively shaped a long-term adjustment policy to deal constructively with the 
protectionist pressures that were generated. Once it let the genie out of the 
bottle, it never really stuffed it back in. 
David Stockman, the president’s director of the Office of Management and 
Budget, summed up the Reagan administration’s record on trade as follows: 
“And so the essence of the Reagan Administration’s trade policy became clear: 
Espouse free trade, but find an excuse on every occasion to embrace the oppo- 
site. As time passed, [it] would find occasions aplenty” (Stockman 1986, 158). 
The level of trade protection should not be the sole criterion to judge any 
administration’s trade policy  or even its import relief policies. Indeed, the 
deeper faults in the Reagan administration’s record lay in its macroeconomic 
and exchange rate policies, which generated severe casualties in the tradable 
sector; in its choice of  political-not  legal-criteria  to award import relief; 
and in its lack of long-term policies either to restore recipients of import relief 
to global competitiveness or to facilitate their adjustment into other, more 
promising industries. 
The major trade development of the Reagan period was the series of record- 
breaking trade deficits. The tradable sector was the primary casualty of  the 
Reagan era’s superdollar exchange rate policy that derived from its macroeco- 
nomic policy mix. The record-breaking  trade deficits of the 1980s fueled enor- 
mous protectionist pressures from US. interests that were directly hurt by the 
competitive buffeting from imported goods. These economic pressures, in 
turn,  presented demands on the government for policies to deal with the mount- 
ing list of industries seeking import relief. 
While macroeconomic policy generated unprecedented pressure for protec- 
tionism, to which the Reagan administration succumbed in its trade policy, 
there were times that the administration-for  whatever calculus of  political, 
economic, and legal reasons-chose  not to raise tariffs or quotas in the face 
of  an import relief petition. And there were important differences between 
Reagan’s  first and second administrations. His second administration aban- 
doned its neglect of the dollar and coordinated with its trading partners in the 
Plaza Agreement of 22 September 1985 to depreciate the dollar. Moreover, in 
the second Reagan administration, the pressures from some industries to gain 
market access overseas eventually captured the attention of the new team of 
policymakers-Treasury  Secretary James A. Baker I11 and U.S. Trade Repre- 
sentative Clayton Yeutter-which  resulted in the first self-initiated Section 301 
market-opening initiatives. Other important and constructive initiatives were 
taken by the Reagan administration  during its eight years in office-most  nota- 
bly, the conclusion of  negotiations for a US.-Canada Free Trade Agreement 
and the launching of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade talks:  In short, 
4. For further details, see Richardson’s paper in this volume. Note, moreover, that neither Rich- 
ardson’s paper nor this one discusses export controls. 668  Paula Stern 
while the flawed efforts to deal with politically potent import pressures were 
not the sum total of the Reagan administration’s  trade policy, they colored prac- 
tically every other trade issue at the time. 
The Reagan administration’s trade policy has left a burdensome legacy. By 
granting import relief in ways that exceeded its legal mandate or skirted con- 
ventional import regulatory practice, the White House legitimized efforts of 
others to use political muscle-not  necessarily economic merit or legal criteria 
on “injury” or “unfair competition”-and  opened the door wider for special 
interest pleading to replace national interest as the basis for making U.S. trade 
policy. Moreover, it opted for short-term political expediencies of import relief 
and  rejected  long-term  constructive,  competition-enhancing  policies  for 
import-affected industries, by greatly reducing, for example, displaced worker 
benefits under the Trade Adjustment Assistance program. By substituting pro- 
tection for adjustment, it lost its chance to restore trade-affected industries and 
workers to  health in the event that those protected industries that had been 
fundamentally crippled by the macroeconomic and exchange rate blows would 
eventually have their import relief crutch removed. 
Today’s economists, politicians, and media commentators are preoccupied 
with finding solutions to the problematic economic legacy left by the Reagan 
administration in the 1980~.~  Most attention is presently devoted to the budget 
deficits amassed during this period, the causal role of which in trade deficits is 
not coincidental. The severe consequences of these are slowly being perceived 
by the average American and acknowledged by  a growing number, including 
those who supported the administration’s policies at the time. 
Similarly in trade policy, the legacy of the Reagan administration haunts its 
successors. In spite of the fact that the U.S. trade deficit has declined 80 per- 
cent in volume terms from the third quarter of  1986 to the fourth quarter of 
1990, the Reagan-era record-breaking trade deficits and ensuing protectionist 
pressures have bequeathed America and the world a legitimization of  certain 
ideas and processes that the trading system is struggling with today.6 
While protectionism-which  rose as high as 22 percent of  GNP in  1986 
(Hufbauer, Berliner, and Elliot  1985, 20)-may  presently be  receding, the 
5. For a recent expression, see Rowen (1990): “Instead of the Reagan promises, what the nation 
got was a series of budget deficits that more than doubled the national debt accumulated over the 
prior 20 years.” 
6.  For example, “results-oriented’  trade policy is a popular banner for today’s interventionists in 
international markets, who contrast their approach to a multilaterally sanctioned,  process-oriented, 
rules-based policy that the proponents claim has been asymmetrical and disadvantageous to the 
United States. The results-oriented managed traders even find themselves frustrated by the negli- 
gible results of bilateral negotiations that purport to open foreign markets by  changing the rules. 
A results-oriented  managed-trade  approach tends to be bilateral, not multilateral, and attempts 
to  achieve  “trade  results”-e.g.,  quantifiable  quotas  or market  share-not  changes in rules: 
‘‘ ‘Results-oriented’ advocates measure success in terms of reductions in the U.S. bilateral deficit 
with Japan or increased market shares for specific sectors or industries in that country. The mea- 
sure of success of the Reagan Administration’s ‘results’ was not so much economic as political” 
(Tyson, in press). 669  Trade Policy 
Reagan administration’s  most lasting legacy may be not what it bequeathed but 
rather what it failed to leave behind. The Reagan administration’s trade policy 
may  have  achieved  short-term political objectives, but  it neglected an  im- 
portant long-term trade policy objective: equipping American firms to compete 
better by  improving their performance through adjustment strategies for both 
management and  worker^.^ Thus, the cost of Reagan’s trade policy to the con- 
sumer was high but the benefits to the producer and the nation fleeting. 
The Rule-Oriented versus the Politics-as-Usual Systems 
In the United States, there are two basic structures for dealing with trade 
complaints. The first structure is the rule-oriented system of settling trade dis- 
putes. Here, problems are resolved within the framework of legal standards. 
The second structure utilizes the political system. Relief can be sought from 
either Congress or the president. The Reagan administration’s  trade policies of 
the 1980s set into play actions resulting in the political system swamping the 
rule-oriented system, leaving behind a legacy-in  terms of  processes-that 
unfortunately the United States and the world will have to cope with economi- 
cally, politically, legally, and diplomatically for decades to come. 
The Rule-Oriented System 
The rule-oriented system is designed to produce a particular foreordained 
outcome. When complainants allege unfair competition, the relevant statutes 
require investigations with relatively little room for political influence. Ex- 
perts, evidence, data, and analyses play significant 
Under the rule-oriented system, criteria are set, transparency prevails, and 
decisions made on the record are all sanctioned by multilateral covenants under 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This is the basis for the 
trade laws administered by the International Trade Administration (ITA) of the 
Department of  Commerce (DOC) and the U.S. International Trade Commis- 
sion (ITC). 
The ITC is an important part of the rule-oriented approach to settling trade 
disputes. An independent agency of  the U.S. government, the ITC is equipped 
to shield Congress and the president-an  instrument that is designed to yield 
swift, nonpolitical approaches to trade issues that would be difficult for elected 
officials to resolve (see Stem 1990).9  At the ITC, all industries and countrk- 
7. According to David Stockman (1986, 156-57), the trade policy of the Reagan administration 
“sought to use the subsidy, trade, and legal powers of the state to sustain industries that could no 
longer sustain themselves. Industrial policy replaced the test of the marketplace with raw political 
power. It locked in obsolete labor and capital to unproductive use. It impoverished society.” 
8. For further elaboration, see Stern (1989, 1-2). 
9. Note also the following: “We argue later that the autonomy of the ITC from short-term con- 
gressional preferences reflects a preference  for liberal trade that is more fundamental than the 
need to respond to short-run constituency pressures for trade protection. We do not suggest that if 670  Paula Stern 
large and small-get  their day in court. With the ITC anchoring the system, 
there is a reliance on expert opinion, and a definite procedure is apparent to 
all litigants. 
Most investigations involve allegations of unfair and injurious competition 
from subsidized imports or dumped imports (imports sold at less than fair 
value) and are intended to yield “fair” pricing. Complaints are filed under anti- 
dumping and countervailing duty statutes (Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930). 
The ITA  rules on whether dumping or subsidization has in fact occurred as 
alleged. The ITC rules in a parallel investigation on whether a petitioning do- 
mestic industry is suffering “material” injury as a result of  dumped or subsi- 
dized imports. 
If  the ITC and the DOC both make positive determinations, a dumping or 
countervailing duty is applied to remove the unfair advantage of the import. 
The level of the duty is determined by  calculations by  the DOC based on the 
margin of “unfair” activity it has found. Another arm  of the executive branch, 
the Customs Service of the Department of Treasury, collects the duty. The ITC 
also pursues complaints against imports involving intellectual property rights 
disputes (patents, copyrights, and trademarks; Sec. 337 of Tariff Act of  1930). 
Its Section 201 escape clause cases combine elements of both the rule-oriented 
and the political system. Under Section 201, the ITC conducts investigations 
of fairly traded imports and sends a recommendation for action to the presi- 
dent, who may consider questions within the political realm before acting to 
limit imports (see Stem 1989). 
The International Trade Commission was originally designed by  progres- 
sives at the turn of the century to “take the tariff out of politics.”’O  Changes in 
the law, particularly in 1975 and 1978, structured the agency to be even more 
independent of the political process and especially to be freer from White 
House influence. The ITC budget goes directly to Congress without passing 
the scrutiny of the Office of  Management and Budget. The members of  the 
commission are appointed to the quasi-judicial tribunal for nine years-one 
year longer than any president can sit in the White House. An appointee cannot 
be reappointed by the president, so decisions at the commission need never be 
made with the thought of pleasing or displeasing the White House or Capitol 
Hill. The chairmanship rotates between the parties, and the president may not 
designate either of  his last two appointees to be chairman-again  as a way 
congressional preferences dramatically shifted, Congress could not reassess control” (Goldstein 
and Lenway 1989,308). 
10. The progressive participants at the turn of the century tried to “take the tariff out of politics” 
by  establishing an independent, nonpartisan agency: “A Congress distrustful of the President can 
give more power to the Commission; a President who wishes to avoid congressional criticism can 
attempt to manipulate policy through the instrumentality of the Commission. . . . Both the execu- 
tive and legislative branches can try to exploit the agency’s theoretical impartiality in supporting 
their own views. Instead of taking the tariff out of politics, the result has been to draw the Tariff 
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of  insulating commission decisions from diplomatic pressures that might be 
transmitted through the White House. 
It is no surprise, however, that, in a democracy such as the United States, the 
ITC is not entirely divorced from the political process. Congress-particularly 
chairmen of the Finance and Ways and Means committees-endeavors  to in- 
fluence the appointment process of commissioners and chairmen to the com- 
mission, which ultimately is decided by the president with the advice and con- 
sent of the Senate. The Reagan White House played “fast and loose” with the 
appointment process to try to tip the party balance and strengthen White House 
control over the commission through the timing and designation of members 
and the chairman to the agency. At least on one occasion Congress objected to 
White House manipulation of the rules for selecting members and designating 
the chairman, and the chairmanship eventually rotated as the statute had origi- 
nally envisioned. 
Furthermore, the fact that the ITC conducts its “unfair imports” investiga- 
tions-of  dumped and subsidized imports-in  tandem with the ITA  of  the 
Department of Commerce suggests that the “rule-making” process itself is nei- 
ther entirely mechanistic nor divorced from the political process. The ITA  is 
part of the executive branch, which is ultimately headed by the highest elected 
official in the nation, the president. As shall be discussed in the case of semi- 
conductors and lumber, the rules on “unfair imports” left room for judgment 
and discretionary behavior on the part of the decision makers who were politi- 
cal appointees in the Reagan administration and who thus were exposed to 
political pressure to read their mandate narrowly or broadly, depending on 
the situation. 
The Politics-as-Usual System 
In contrast to the rule-oriented system is the political system, where decision 
makers are elected officials who have to achieve policies that are politically 
palatable. Here, the decision makers are directly exposed to political muscle.” 
The guidelines for the political approach to trade issues are obviously less 
clear. Both the Congress and the president can operate outside the confines of 
the formal trade laws. Congress passes new laws to supersede the old-if  the 
president goes along with Congress and does not veto the legislative changes. 
1  I. For a discussion of  the multiple objectives that an elected official pursues in U.S. trade 
policy, see Stem (1 978, p. xiii): “One may reasonably presume that the prospect of electoral impact 
drives politicians to take stands that a non-elected policy-maker would not take. Policy in the 
United States is the product of  elected politicians,  not simply the work of bureaucrats-even 
bureaucrats who are keenly aware of the American political scene. Elected politicians-in  the 
Congress or White House-who  act to shape foreign policy have other equally important objec- 
tives in mind. They must try to satisfy requirements at home, too” (see also pp. 196-97).  See also 
the discussion in Goldstein and Lenway (1989,305): “State policy is a function of the equilibrium 
which emerges from the efforts of  those who want a protectionist policy and those who represent 
interest in free trade. Governments, composed of election-maximizing representatives, reflect the 
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In the case of the Reagan administration, the White House took full advantage 
of the flexibility inherent in the political system to promote a free trade public 
image while simultaneously protecting many powerful industries claiming to 
suffer from international competition. Without the encumbrance of  statutory 
standards such as the “serious injury” test in Section 201 or the “material in- 
jury” test in Title VII cases, the administration unilaterally decided what im- 
ports were “fair” and/or injurious in a number of  significant trade cases. By 
legitimizing the unilateral interpretation of what constitutes “unfair” competi- 
tion, the Reagan administration has opened the door for others to follow suit. 
William Niskanen, one of three members of President Reagan’s Council of 
Economic Advisers, frankly details the “breaches” in the Reagan administra- 
tion’s own objectives for its trade policy once the Reagan administration pro- 
vided “an opening for a unilateral U.S. interpretation of what constitutes ‘fair 
trade.”’  Niskanen blames the breaches on “the combination of  some  1980 
campaign commitments, controversies with [sic]  the administration, the long 
recession of 1981 and 1982, and the rapid increase in the real exchange rate.” l2 
Congress and the Executive Branch 
Trade policy in the political system of the United States is a good example 
of the separation of powers. Two branches of government-Congress  and the 
executive-have  claims on shaping trade policy outcomes, which naturally has 
led to a history of White House-Congress  tension in the trade policy arena. 
In democratic America, both Congress and the president feel the pressure of 
domestic economic groups wanting protection from international competition 
(and/or help pushing past  market barriers overseas). And  cooperation and 
trust-important  requirements for better trade performance-have  not always 
characterized policy over the past three decades. 
The history of the ITC is a paradigm of White House-Congress  tensions in 
the trade policy area. The Tariff Commission, the forerunner of the ITC, was 
created in  1917 to give the Congress leverage with the White House in the 
12. This is the quotation in its entirety: “The draft of this statement [the 8 July 1981 ‘Statement 
on U.S. Trade Policy’], prepared by the Office of the US.  Trade Representative and the Commerce 
Department, described the objective as ‘free and fair trade,’ providing an opening for a unilateral 
U.S. interpretation of what constitutes ‘fair’ trade. A last-minute intervention by Treasury, OMB, 
and the CEA-the  core of the free trade coalition in the cabinet-was  the origin of the primary 
theme in the final statement. The statement developed five central policy components: (1) Restora- 
tion of strong non-inflationary economic growth; (2) reduction of US-imposed disincentives to 
exports; (3) effective enforcement of US. trade laws and international agreements; (4) effective 
approach  to industrial  adjustment  problems,  with  a primary  emphasis  on market  forces;  and 
(5) reduction of government barriers to the  flow of  trade and investment among nations, with 
strong emphasis upon improvements and extensions of international trade rules. For the conditions 
anticipated in mid-1981, these five elements would have been a satisfactory and sufficient state- 
ment of trade policy. The combination of some 1980 campaign commitments, controversies with 
the administration, the long recession of 1981 and 1982, and the rapid increase in the real exchange 
rate, however, led to numerous breaches of this policy by the administration” (Niskanen  1988, 
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trade area. However, its creation also had a different-if  not contradictory- 
purpose. The Tariff Commission was meant to create a buffer that would shield 
Congress (and ultimately the president) from a constant stream of petitions for 
trade protection. Congress wanted and still wants a strong voice in trade policy, 
but it recognizes that it needs political protection from all the specific demands 
of industries that before 1917 it had faced directly. Likewise, over the years, 
the presidency has also learned to use the ITC as a political “flak catcher.” 
Clearly, in a democracy, it is never possible to take the “tariff out of politics” 
entirely, but, as this paper argues, the Reagan administration did much to re- 
verse the tendency in U.S.  trade jurisprudence to make U.S. trade law more 
rule-oriented and less politicized. 
The Reagan Administration’s Macroeconomic Policies Fuel Protectionist 
Pressures, to Which It Succumbs 
The administration of  the Reagan era’s macroeconomic policies-loose 
fiscal policy and tight monetary policy-fueled  much of the protectionist ani- 
mus that spread among the industrial and agricultural trade casualties of these 
policies. Interest rates had started to shoot up in the late 1970s, but their sting- 
ing effects continued in the early 1980s through the longest and deepest reces- 
sion experienced by America in the postwar period. Among the strongest and 
loudest casualties were the heavily cyclical and heavily trade-affected auto and 
steel industries, whose international competitiveness had already been slipping 
in the 197Os.l3 
The strong dollar, caused largely by  high interest rates, compounded the 
trade woes of  American industry. While the strong dollar facilitated the fi- 
nancing of  the U.S. fiscal deficit and helped fight inflation, it did so at the 
expense of the tradable sector in the economy. The superdollar was a super- 
headache, making the problems of  declining competitiveness, which many 
American firms had been experiencing since the 1960s and 1970s, much worse 
and more apparent.I4  It made imports cheaper in the U.S. market and exports 
costlier overseas, exposing in the form of growing trade deficits the weaknesses 
that admittedly had already been developing at home. In short, U.S. industries 
and workers were rocked, and pressures for protection mounted. 
By the mid-1980s, as U.S.  industries staggered from the burden of a soaring 
13. While serving on the International Trade Commission from  1978 through  1984, and as 
chairwoman from 1984 to 1986, I witnessed the increasing U.S. dependence on international trade 
through the increase in the caseload of the commission. The ITC caseload grew by  82 percent 
from recession year 1981 to recovery year 1983. In 1984, 203 cases were instituted, and the work- 
load was growing at an annual rate of  26 percent. In the  1985 fiscal year, the ITC initiated 22 
percent more investigations than in 1984 (see my speeches at Wender, Murase & White, 20 Octo- 
ber 1984, and the National Economists Club, 12 November 1985). 
14. The fact that the 1980-81 current account was in surplus masked the underlying deteriora- 
tion of many of America’s most prominent industries (see my speech to the Los Angeles Foreign 
Affairs Council, 8 November 1989; and also Stem and London [19901). 674  Paula Stern 
dollar and burgeoning import competition and flat exports, the perception was 
rife that the administration was neither adequately nor consistently using its 
legal authority to defend U.S. trade interests that Congress had authorized in 
prior legislation. 
The Reagan administration’s positions on trade encouraged this perception 
by  talking “free trade” for the general public but acting “protectionist” for 
specific industries. It opposed “protectionism” philosophically. It reveled in 
the rise of the dollar and appeared to disregard the impact of the superdollar on 
almost the whole U.S. manufacturing sector and on sectors of the agricultural 
economy exposed to foreign competition. 
Ironically,  the  policy  contradictions  within  the  Reagan  administration 
yielded results that it did not welcome. Its basic macroeconomic and dollar 
policy neglect made it impossible to realize their trade philosophy and rhetoric. 
Its antiprotectionist rhetoric disdained congressionally sanctioned trade reme- 
dies, yet the administration in fact expanded areas for executive action. At the 
same time that the Reagan team criticized and/or ignored the trade laws and 
adjustment programs developed by Congress over the years, it took the politi- 
cal lead in using so-called voluntary restraint agreements (VRAs) or orderly 
marketing arrangements (OMAs) negotiated with  U.S. trading partners to 
achieve the same objectives. By using VRAs or OMAs, which were either 
outside the congressionally sanctioned list of trade remedies or outside the 
international system of rules, the president limited imports in a number of ma- 
jor sectors of the economy while reinforcing White House links with important 
constituency groups. 
Automobiles 
In  1979, the United Auto Workers and Ford Motor Corporation petitioned 
the ITC for import relief. At the same time, workers petitioned the Carter ad- 
ministration for trade adjustment assistance, and the Carter administration 
complied. Approximately $1 billion was paid to auto workers who lost their 
jobs because of imports. By mid-1981, Ronald Reagan had taken office, and 
he persuaded the Congress-the  Senate being controlled by the Republican 
party-to  eliminate funding for the worker displacement program. Instead, 
Reagan substituted protection for adjustment (see Lang 1991, 10-1 1). 
In the automobile investigation, unfair trade was not even alleged. The ITC 
issued a negative Section 201 finding that imports were not the most important 
cause of serious injury. But the Reagan administration ignored the finding and 
the law. For the first and only time ever, a president chose to ignore the political 
shield that the ITC had provided and proceeded to provide protection for an 
industry found not injured by  imports. The negative finding did not stop the 
petition. The Reagan administration, keeping a 1980 campaign pledge, negoti- 
ated a so-called voluntary restraint agreement (VRA) with Japan. 
Japan announced a VRA in May  1981 in an atmosphere of increasing con- 
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and sectoral reciprocity in conducting trade relations. From Japan’s point of 
view, it is not difficult to understand that it may have calculated that agreeing 
to the VRA might help fend off worse actions. But the Reagan administration’s 
reasons are harder to defend. 
Some have argued that Reagan had no choice but to bow to congressional 
pressure. However, in 198  1, Reagan had been overwhelmingly elected and was 
still in his honeymoon period with the Congress. Had Congress  pushed a quota 
or domestic content bill through both houses of  Congress-something  that 
never occurred-Reagan  had the political clout to veto such legislation and 
sustain a veto override that would have required both houses of  Congress to 
whip up a two-thirds margin to defeat the president. 
In fact, contemporary sources now confirm that Reagan was determined to 
keep a campaign pledge to protect the automobile industry. David Stockman 
gives a lively account of the Cabinet Council meeting on Tuesday, 3 March, 
198  1, where Transportation Secretary Drew Lewis announced that “the time 
had come to ‘keep faith with our campaign pledge’ to restrict Japanese auto 
imports.” Stockman’s account throws sharp light on the Reagan choice: 
[Special Assistant to the President] Meese was trundling around the White 
House, doing what he did best: quietly pounding square pegs into round 
holes, convincing himself and the President that all we had to do to maintain 
our free trade position was to convince the Japanese “voluntarily” to restrict 
their own exports. 
Under the Meese formulation, our hands would be clean; the Japanese 
would do the dirty work to themselves. It was another case of not knowing 
the difference between campaigning and governing. In the latter what counts 
is outcomes, not positions. 
Thus, at a task force meeting on March 19 attended by the President, the 
scheme was laid on the table. Our ambassador to Japan, Mike Mansfield, 
would be instructed to “talk turkey” in private with the Japanese, and warn 
them of the building momentum on the Hill in favor of the Danforth auto 
quota bill. He could tell them that it was up to them: that if they wanted to 
head the bill off at the pass, they must impose export restrictions on them- 
selves. Otherwise it would be done by the U.S. Congress. 
I hadn’t yet given up the fight. So much depended on it. I told the President 
that if he was against the Danforth bill, then all he had to do was to signal, 
in no uncertain terms, that he would veto it. He would tell the Congress that 
the bill violated every free market principle we held. 
What’s more, it would be a serious political mistake to grant special relief 
to one industry and region of the country. All that would do was encourage 
the fiercely parochial instincts of  the Congress, the same ones that were 
already causing such havoc with our spending cuts. 
The President replied that he would not signal a veto in advance. My heart 
sank when I heard that. Studied silence on our part on the matter of  this 
horrendous piece of legislation would itself be an unmistakable signal to the 
Japanese: unless they imposed their own “voluntary” restrictions, we would 
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Sure enough, after Mansfield and [U.S. Trade Representative] Brock had 
held a few “consultations” with the Japanese, they did mysteriously “volun- 
teer” to limit their auto exports to 1.68 million vehicles-right  on the eve of 
Prime Minister Nakasone’s visit in May. (Stockman 1986, 154-55,  157-58) 
Reagan had decided to relegate regulatory issues such as protecting domes- 
tic industries to the lowest of his economic priorities, telling his chairman of 
the Council of Economic Advisers, Murray Weidenbaum, that political capital 
in the economic field would be reserved for budgetary battles.15  But, no matter 
what priority he placed on trade regulation, the impact of his policy was mea- 
surable. 
The voluntary restraint agreements with the Japanese auto industry that were 
in effect from 1980 through 1984 brought U.S. automakers some $9 billion in 
added revenue. But an ITC study in 1985 showed that Japan earned an extra 
$5 billion as well. The automobile experience gave us a new trade phenome- 
non. The Japanese renewed the VRA unilaterally for a fifth and again for a 
sixth year  and  so on. This is bilateralism degenerating into “monolateral- 
ism”-preemptive  self-imposed protection for one’s ailing trading partner (see 
Stem 1990a, 8).16 Ironically, the quotas also intensified the competitive chal- 
lenge to the Big Three U.S. automobile manufacturers by accelerating the for- 
eign direct investment of Japanese manufacturers in the United States. 
Steel 
Another cavalier misuse of  the law occurred in October 1984, one month 
before the presidential elections. The Reagan administration again ignored the 
ITC, this time dismissing a Section 201 affirmative finding of import injury on 
several categories of  carbon steel. But, while the Reagan administration ig- 
nored the affirmative finding, its negotiators imposed VRAs with twenty-seven 
different countries, expanding the categories of steel to include specialty steel. 
The administration muddied the distinction between fair and unfair competi- 
tion by justifying its quotas, which came in response to the ITC recommenda- 
tion on a Section 201 fair competition petition for relief for the steel industry, 
as a necessary response to “unfair” import competition to steel.  I7 
15. Students of protectionism have also noted that there is a general exaggeration of Congress’s 
ability to influence the direction  of policy. Specifically, Goldstein and Lenway state, “What is 
unusual is, given the extent to which trade policy has been politicized, the minimal role Congress 
plays in deciding the amount and form of aid to constituents. In retrospect, congressional activities 
appear to be far more symbolic than substantive” (1  989,304). See also Stem and Wechsler (1985) 
and Weidenbaum (1985). 
16. Auctioning quotas would arguably minimize the cost of relief to the economy by transfer- 
ring the quota rents from the foreign producers to the  U.S. Treasury. It also provides a source of 
revenue for the administration of the quota. The revenue generated by auctioned quotas could also 
conceivably be dedicated to an adjustment program designed to assist genuinely those bearing the 
greatest burden of an industry’s efforts to compete globally. For other arguments favoring auc- 
tioning quotas, see “Additional Remedy Views” (1985) and Bergsten et al. (1987). 
17. The confusion  sown by  this decision is best appreciated by  citing the official language 
describing  it: “On September  18, 1984, the President announced he would not provide import 677  Trade Policy 
CEA member Niskanen (1988, 141-44) recalls the politics surrounding the 
Shortly after the cabinet meeting [in which the cabinet decided to ignore the 
recommendations made by  the ITC], Brock held a press conference on the 
decision that was a masterpiece of blue smoke and mirrors. The first press 
reports,  with  one  exception, reported  that  “Reagan  rejects  steel  import 
curbs.” Only Clyde Famsworth of the New York Times saw through the blue 
smoke to recognize that the administration had substituted its own system 
of quotas for those recommended by the ITC, quoting a foreign steel official 
to the effect that “the administration is either lying to the steel industry or 
to the importers.” . . . As was characteristic of the 1984 campaign, the ad- 
ministration was on both sides of  this issue, articulating a policy of  free 
trade and implementing an extensive set of new import quotas. 
The actions of the administration with regard to the steel industry are repre- 
sentative of its consistent choice of political solutions over the use of the rule- 
oriented system. In this case, it submitted to the pressures of an industry and 
chose to ignore the established methods of import relief recommended by the 
ITC. The consequences were the same as in autos: import protection was given 
to one of the country’s most politically influential industries in a way that devi- 
ated from congressionally sanctioned rules that call for temporary relief ex- 
tended on a nondiscriminatory basis (see Stem 1990a, 8-9). 
While the president was willing to grant import relief, he abhorred anything 
that could be labeled an industrial policy. The United Steel Workers wanted 
conditional relief to make sure that the steel companies would reinvest and 
modernize during the period of relief. So, at the urging of  the steelworkers, 
Congress passed the Steel Import Stabilization Act requiring the reinvestment 
into modernization efforts of any cash flow derived from relief. The act also 
required the ITC and the USTR to monitor this reinvestment. Both Congress 
and the White House lined up on the side of import relief. The difference was 
that the Reagan administration seemed to be interested in the short-term politi- 
cal imperative to provide relief while Congress endeavored to force actions by 
management to encourage long-term adjustment. 
administration’s decision: 
relief under a section 201 petition filed by  Bethlehem Steel Corporation and the United  Steel 
Workers of America. The President determined such relief would not be in the national economic 
interest since it would raise steel prices, reduce jobs and undermine the domestic and international 
competitiveness of US.  steel-consuming industries. At the same time, however, the President an- 
nounced a program designed to handle the growing volume of unfairly trade steel imports entering 
the United States. The program’s objectives included: avoiding global protection; offsetting the 
injurious effects of unfair trade practices and vigorously applying unfair trade laws; negotiating 
arrangements with countries whose exports have increased rapidly, excessively and unfairly; and 
giving the steel industry a period of relative stability to facilitate its restructuring and moderniza- 
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The Second Reagan Administration 
The rhetoric changed after the President’s  reelection. Rhetorically,  fair trade 
replacedfree trade. The “unfair” trade justification had debuted as a theme 
during the 1984 presidential campaign decision to forge VRAs for the steel 
industry. In the second Reagan administration, it became the cloak for new 
forms of import protection for other industries including lumber and semicon- 
ductors. Secretary Baker enunciated the rhetoric that characterized the second 
Reagan administration: “Nor have  we neglected our responsibilities to fair 
trade-because  without fair trade, public support for free trade would surely 
collapse. For the last several years, I think I can safely say, no Administration 
has worked harder than this one against subsidized imports and trade barriers 
abroad. President Reagan, in fact, has granted more import relief to U.S. indus- 
try than any of his predecessors in more than half a century.”  l8 
The White House responded to import petitions as it had in the first adminis- 
tration: when politically expedient. The freewheeling use of the trade laws also 
persisted into the second administration. But, whereas the “unfair” trade stat- 
utes that are on the books to counteract subsidized and dumped imports were 
eschewed in the first administration, the administration actually stretched its 
mandate by self-initiating or reopening previously closed investigations when 
political pressure to do so mounted. 
Semiconductors 
On  31 July  1986, President Reagan announced the Japan-United  States 
Semiconductor  Agreement. The semiconductor  case led to a five-year bilateral 
pact  with  Japan  signed  31  July  1986. The  agreement covers  pricing in 
the United States and third markets and an understanding on increasing U.S. 
market share in Japan. In return, the United States agreed to suspend a U.S. 
industry-initiated Section 301 market access case and two antidumping cases, 
including one case that the DOC self-initiated on dynamic random access 
memory (DRAM) covering 256 K and above semiconductor chips. In March 
1987, the United States subsequently claimed that Japan had  “breached its 
bilateral agreement  on fair and equitable market access and ‘dumped’  Japanese 
semiconductors  in the United States and third country markets,” and the presi- 
dent increased duties to 100  percent ad valorem on $300 million worth of Japa- 
nese  products,  including color  televisions,  laptop  computers,  and  hand- 
powered tools (see Stern 1990a, 11). 
Lumber 
In 1983, the Department of Commerce dismissed the original softwood lum- 
ber industry countervailing duty case on grounds that there was no countervai- 
lable subsidy. On  19 May  1986, the U.S. industry filed another complaint 
18. From remarks by Secretary of the Treasury James A. Baker 111 to the Institute for Interna- 
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against the Canadians. Under mounting pressure from industry and its repre- 
sentatives in Congress from the Northwest and the South, the Department of 
Commerce chose to take up the petition. The political pressure continued dur- 
ing the period of the investigation when lower-level bureaucrats at the DOC 
ordinarily calculate countervailing duty margins that dictate the duty level. 
During this stage of the investigation, top political appointees from the Depart- 
ment of Commerce made repeated appearances on the Hill both in open hear- 
ings and behind closed-door  session^.'^ 
On 16 October 1986, the Department of Commerce imposed a preliminary 
countervailing duty of  15 percent on Canadian softwood lumber. On 30 De- 
cember 1986, the United States and Canada settled by  agreement the long- 
standing dispute over Canada’s pricing practices. Canada agreed to implement 
a 15 percent tax on exports of softwood lumber, thereby neutralizing the effect 
of its lumber subsidies. In return, the US. lumber industry withdrew its coun- 
tervailing duty petition, and the United States agreed to terminate the increased 
duty (while Canada got the revenues) (see Stem 1991a, 8). 
Machine Tools 
When the administration wanted to raise import barriers but lacked an “un- 
fair” trade excuse, it resorted to actions not contemplated in the trade laws. In 
the spring of 1986, Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige rejected a peti- 
tion from the National Machine Tool Builders Association to restrict imports, 
on national defense grounds. But, on 20 May  1986 the president announced 
that cutbacks would be sought as an inducement for the supplying nations- 
Taiwan, Japan, Switzerland, and West Germany-to  cut back on their own. 
Baldrige likened the process to the steel VRAs (see Stem 1990a, 9). 
Renewed Congressional Assertiveness in Trade Policy 
The beginning of wisdom for the Reagan administration was the admission 
that its macroeconomic policies that yielded the superdollar had compounded 
the problem of restoring U.S. economic competitiveness, which had been slip- 
ping for decades. Once the president’s reelection had been achieved, the ad- 
ministration in 1985 shifted policy course. In coordination with its chief trad- 
ing partners, the United States achieved the Plaza Agreement in September 
1985, which leaned on the dollar, already beginning to decline from its extra- 
terrestrial heights. The hope was that a dollar depreciation would reduce the 
trade deficit. And the administration-in  an unsuccessful attempt to eliminate 
the justification for Congress to enact new trade legislation-also  began to 
pursue Section 301 market-access trade cases that heretofore had been ignored 
(see Stem 1990a, 12). The hope was that these actions would avert congres- 
sional action. So argued Secretary Baker, who justified the policy shift at the 
19. From a conversation with former congressman Don Bonker (D-WA), 2 February 1991. 680  Paula Stem 
White House as a way  to extract the sting from some of  Congress’s original 
legislative initiatives, including the Gephardt Amendment.” 
But it was too little, too late. Congress had lost its confidence in the adminis- 
tration’s ability to initiate trade policy effectively. As a result, the Omnibus 
Trade and Competitive Act of  1988 became the first congressionally initiated 
major trade bill since Smoot-Hawley half a century before. 
This congressional preemption was precipitated by a number of basic beliefs 
held by  the bipartisan majority of  Congress. Impatience and disdain for the 
Reagan administration’s trade policy underpinned the congressional assertion 
of  power. But, even if  the bill is interpreted as a repudiation of  the Reagan 
administration’s blend of rhetoric and action, Congress echoed the Reagan ad- 
ministration’s  explanations  for  America’s  trade  problems  (namely,  “un- 
fairness”) and its solutions (namely, heavy reliance on protection). Conse- 
quently, at least one important theme in the trade bill was that “unfair” trade is 
a major cause of the U.S. trade deficit and of the problems experienced by the 
U.S. industrial sector (see Stem 1990b). 
Legacies of the Reagan Era 
Inadequate leadership in the 1980s has left the United States with a trade 
policy legacy that rewards industries that can bring political muscle to bear at 
both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue. Trade protection increased in the Reagan 
era, but the industries that received protection at significant cost have not ad- 
justed to the point of catching up or surpassing their overseas competition. 
There are other unintentional negative results of  the legacy that flow from 
the above observation. By appearing to give low priority to trade regulation- 
particularly in its first term-and  giving short shrift to trade remedies and ad- 
justment that the law provided, the Reagan administration set into play move- 
ment among restive casualties of  its  1980s economic policies to dismiss the 
legal framework for dealing with import competition-particularly  Section 
201-or  at the most to use it to set the stage for a political assault on the 
White House. 
The frequent references to “unfair” trade, as in the steel VRAs, to justify 
market intervention in spite of the fact that no unfair trade had been demon- 
strated have led to confused official and public thinking about the purpose of 
the trade laws. The administration relied on claims of “unfair” trade to support 
trade actions that ignored the mandated rules. The public has consequently 
been misled to believe that the major US. trade problem is the unfairness of 
20. “The Gephardt amendment would trigger Presidential negotiations with major trade-surplus 
nations that exclude American goods or services” (Stem 1987). See also Wolf  (1991, 1): “The 
Gephardt Amendment . . . would have required those countries that had  a large bilateral  trade 
deficit with the  U.S. to reduce that deficit ten percent a year for three years. This proposal was 
found wanting, and Super 301 emerged as a more or less general set of guidelines to the President 
who retained ultimate discretion in its application.” 681  Trade Policy 
our trading partners. In fact, despite hundreds of claims of “unfairness” from 
U.S. industry in the 1980s, “the volume of U.S. imports affected by antidump- 
ing and countervailing duty investigations as a share of total imports amounted 
to only two-tenths of one percent in 1987, four-tenths of one percent in 1988, 
and two-tenths of one percent during the first half of 1989.”21 
The public has also been given the false impression that protection, espe- 
cially against unfairly traded goods, will solve a given industry’s problems. In 
fact, very often an industry’s most important problems are not unfair competi- 
tion and may not even be overseas competition, whether fair or not. The source 
of the industry’s problem may very well be internal and/or exacerbated by gov- 
ernment rules that have unintended consequences for industry. Imports, there- 
fore, may be more symptoms than causes of  an industry’s uncompetitive dis- 
tress  .22 
By substituting political expediency for the use of the rule-oriented system, 
which establishes economic criteria for acting and employs tools that could be 
used to encourage positive and constructive adjustment, the scope and results 
of  the actions were short term and limited. The industry-and  the nation- 
missed out on the full opportunity of “providing temporary relief for an indus- 
try so that the industry will have sufficient time to adjust to the freer interna- 
tional  competition,” to  borrow  the  language  of  Section  201  (19  U.S.C. 
2251-53). 
Altogether, the actions and the accompanying rhetoric-which  often hid 
more than it revealed about the Reagan administration’s trade political think- 
ing-have  contributed to the undermining of  the intellectual support for the 
rule-oriented approach to trade policy, which had characterized every post- 
World War I1 administration’s support for the GATT system. 
Conclusion 
The trade policies of the Reagan administration during the 1980s have left a 
legacy to the 1990s both in terms of  results and in terms of processes. In the 
results category, consumer costs rose. And, while protected U.S. producers 
were able to increase profits (i.e., rents) and/or market share in the short term, 
the longer-term adjustments did not materialize. Lost was the opportunity to 
reap the long-term adjustment benefits that American industries require to re- 
spond to increasing international competition.*’ 
21. From a statement by Ambassador Rufus H. Yerxa on the GATT trade policy review mecha- 
22. For elaboration of the concept of “unfairness” in U.S. trade law, see Stem (1989). 
23. Having spent nine years (involved in over a thousand investigations) at the International 
Trade Commission examining the role of imports in the U.S. marketplace, I caution the reader to 
be very careful when crediting or blaming imports or import relief for how industry performs. 
Take the steel industry, e.g., which has had special trade protection in some form with only short 
lapses since 1968. How did Reagan’s VRAs perform? For the first time since 1982, the industry 
reported profits in the first eight months of  1987. In the meantime, tens of thousands of workers 
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The legacies of protectionist actions with respect to the processes of  trade 
policy will also have lasting effects. The politicization of the rule-oriented ap- 
proach to trade policy and the retreat to unilateral protectionism diminished 
intellectual support for the rule-based multilateral system.24  The public has 
been misled about the purpose of the trade laws and the use of protection when 
a claim of unfair trade is made. And greater congressional assertiveness in the 
trade policy arena has resulted from the inadequate use of  the rule-oriented 
system by the president. 
On the positive side, it is unlikely that any future administration will ever 
again engage in such neglect of exchange rate and trade issues. Nevertheless, 
the Reagan administration’s neglect of  the existing trade laws and rules has 
permanently saddled the United States with a political, economic, diplomatic, 
and legal legacy that George Bush, Reagan’s successor, together with Congress, 
will have for years to come. The Uruguay Round of multilateral trade talks, the 
declining dollar, and bilateral talks with Japan-and  others-are  all helping 
manage the protectionist pressures that have been stirred up. Unfortunately, 
however, the United States now must deal with these problems in a recession- 
ary environment that it had been spared for eight years. And recession naturally 
brings cries for more protection. 
The best hope is that the United States might achieve measurable results in 
reducing barriers in the trading system, based on agreed-on rules with our trad- 
ing partners. Such an approach would not pit results against rules but rather 
achieve a synthesis of the two. 
lost their jobs, and plants closed forever. Did import relief help? Yes. Combined with the dollar 
decline, import relief helped firm prices and fetch profits. But it is noteworthy that most of the 
serious steps to adjust to the realities of international steel trade in the 1980s had taken place from 
1980 to 1983, a period when the U.S. steel market was relatively open and US.  steel producers 
were subject to import pressure. In contrast to its relative inactivity during the 1960s and 1970s, 
the steel industry had only just embarked on making some of the adjustments necessary to return 
it to a more competitive position in the steel market. Plant shutdowns by  U.S. producers were 
more highly concentrated  between  1982 and the first quarter of  1984. Because of  world steel 
overcapacity during this period, these closures, primarily of less efficient facilities, were necessary 
adjustments. The shutdowns allowed the steel industry to focus future investment strategy on those 
facilities that were more efficient and had a better chance of competing in the world steel market. 
Two years after the steel industry’s VRAs were in effect, closures of outmoded excess capacity, 
new labor arrangements, reorganizations (involving mergers and employee buyouts), some modem 
technology, and an infusion of foreign investment occurred. Arguably, market forces had dictated 
those necessary changes before  the VRAs. But trouble lurked under the good news.  Capacity 
utilization had not exceeded 70 percent since 1981. Labor had not made all the needed changes. 
And the financial problems remained severe, as evinced by  the Chapter 11 filing by the second 
largest producer, LTV. 
By 1989, the steel producers were seeking five additional years of quota protection (see  Rebuild- 
ing American Manufacturing  1989).  At that time, the industry was running at full capacity, produc- 
ers were more efficient, and the exchange rate of the dollar was 40-60  percent below its highs 
in 1985. 
24. As noted at the outset, the administration did initiate the Uruguay Round. Thus, it bears 
repeating that, as with other administrations,  there were internal contradictions in trade policy 
directions during the eight years of the Reagan administration. 683  Trade Policy 
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Summary of Discussion 
Murray  Weidenbuum started the discussion by  saying that, compared to the 
average member of  Congress, everyone in the Reagan administration was a 
paragon of free trade. Strom Thurmond, for example, led the congressional 
delegation on textiles to the White House. As chairman of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, he was working very hard to push through the Reagan administra- 
tion’s judicial appointments, so he had significant influence at the White House. 
The shoe delegation, on the other hand, was led by Senator Ted Kennedy, so 
protectionism for shoes was avoided. Weidenbaum felt that the first major free 
trade victory was letting the orderly marketing agreement on shoes expire. 
William Niskunen thought that the major charge against the Reagan trade 
policy was that it had undermined the rule of law in international trade. Almost 
all the trade actions taken by the Reagan administration were inconsistent with 
GATT,  which expressly prohibits quotas, and had no basis under U.S. law. 
These actions were instead private deals between other countries and the Com- 
merce Department or the U.S. Trade Representative. 
Niskanen noted that Congress passed no  significant trade legislation un- 
til 1988. In fact, the trade law under which the United States operated until 
late 1988 had been established in the 1970s and earlier. But trade policy in the 
1980s was consistent with neither these laws nor GATT, and that inconsistency 
has come back to haunt the United States now as it tries to reinforce the rule 
of  law in international trade through the Uruguay Round. The United States 
“has spent the last decade building a record of  going around and under and 
over that law,” and the cost of the direct effects has been far less than the cost 
of undermining the rule of law in trade. 
Phillip Areeda said that, when he worked in the White House under Eisen- 
hower, some of his work was related to international trade. At that time, as he 
supposed was true in the 1980s, much executive branch activity was designed 
to preempt even worse decisions or activities by Congress. 
Areeda believed that one way in which the 1980s differed from the 1950s is 
that protectionist sentiments were more at the fringe of  American economic 
life in the 1950s. Some of the industries that requested protection at that time 
seemed quite insignificant, such as the violin-making industry and the clothes 
pin industry. Still, voluntary restraints on textiles also began in the 1950s and 
began on the assumption that, if the administration did not act, Congress would 
do something worse. The disastrous oil import restrictions adopted in the late 
1950s were ostensibly to protect American national defense but were in fact 
just as politically based as other trade restrictions. 
Overall, Areeda felt that the primary impulse of the executive branch since 
World War  I1 has been in the direction of relatively unencumbered (although 
not perfectly free) trade. The various mechanisms of  antidumping rules, na- 
tional security restrictions, and the International Trade Commission (ITC) had 
been designed to contain the political heat as it erupts from time to time. 685  Trade Policy 
Stem had commented earlier that the Reagan administration had imposed 
certain trade restrictions without taking advantage of the political shield pro- 
vided by the ITC. Areeda supposed that the administration had concluded that 
the ITC had not provided a sufficient shield. Although the ITC’s determinations 
that certain industries had or had not been injured had been helpful to the 
administration, they may have been inadequate to deflect the political heat that 
arose in some cases. 
Paula Stern responded that the president is a very powerful man. President 
Reagan could have vetoed any congressional legislation on automobiles,  just as 
he later vetoed textile and footwear legislation. Reagan had made a campaign 
promise in 1980 to help autoworkers, however, even though the ITC’s decision 
was still pending and he could have said, “Well, wait and see what the ITC 
is going to do.” Stem argued that trade decisions had been highly political 
calculations and had much to do with the president’s desire or willingness to 
check the Congress. 
Weidenbaum added that there was a very deliberate presidential decision to 
expend political capital on issues of budget and taxes. Regulatory issues, such 
as this trade issue, fell into second place and did not receive as much attention. 
William Baxter noted that trade is not a topic on which the administration 
turned to the Justice Department for advice. The Justice Department had “a 
seat at the table” that Baxter usually filled, but, although it repeatedly admon- 
ished the administration that its proposed actions were not authorized by the 
trade laws, nobody seemed to be much influenced by this reasoning. The ad- 
ministration split very consistently, with the same groups on the same sides on 
issue after issue; the legal questions were barely alluded to. 
Martin Feldstein said that he had been shaken on the “rules versus discre- 
tion” issue when a delegation of  Brazilian steel manufacturers requested  a 
quota. They said that their potential buyers were unable to buy their product 
because of the risk of an ex post antidumping assessment and large legal fees. 
A quota, on the other hand, would provide them a safe harbor and enable them 
to import into the Untied States. 
Jefrey Frankel agreed that the enforcement of U.S. trade rules is quite un- 
predictable. Rules on antidumping and countervailing duties are sufficiently 
elastic that one can justify intervening or not intervening for almost any indus- 
try. Perhaps what is needed is a mechanism for settling international disputes, 
such as that being discussed in the Uruguay Round. With such a mechanism, 
the settlement of  these disputes would be perceived internationally as being 
more fair and more predictable. The effectiveness of legal rules hinges on this 
perception, so the unpredictable enforcement of  U.S. trade rules is undermin- 
ing their use. 
Charls Walker added that timely application of the rules is important in gen- 
eral and can be critical to the survival of small companies being hurt by unfair 
trading practices. 
Feldstein then returned to the question of how the 1980s were different from 686  Summary of Discussion 
earlier periods. Was the results-oriented approach new, as Stem had suggested? 
Have the industry-specific market-opening issues become more important in 
the last few years of negotiations, especially with the Japanese and the Kore- 
ans? Are these issues new to the 1980s, or did they already exist but are now 
presented in a slightly different form? 
Stern responded that there was a fourth theme of the Omnibus Trade Act of 
1988, which involved market opening. There was a realization that the United 
States needed to export its way out of its 1980s trade problems, so it needed to 
have open markets overseas. Particularly in the case of Japan, however, there 
was a certain unfairness in market access. In 1985, when the Reagan adminis- 
tration changed its views about the dollar, it also changed its views about Sec- 
tion 301 cases, cases that had largely been ignored until that time. Section 301 
cases are petitions from industries saying that they have had trouble obtaining 
access to overseas markets. They are, in effect, “export-enhancement’’ peti- 
tions. In 1985, work was initiated on some 301 cases-perhaps  in an effort to 
head off congressional legislation, Stem believed-but  it was again a case of 
too little, too late. 
David Richardson said that the Trade Act of  1988 gave the U.S. Trade Rep- 
resentative the right to initiate actions on Section 301 cases alone. It was the 
lack of executive action in this area from 1984 to 1985 that built pressure in 
Congress for further changes in trade policy. 
Feldstein asked why trade policy turned to industry-specific market opening 
in the 1980s. He acknowledged that several earlier rounds of GATT negotia- 
tions had produced reciprocal reductions of tariffs across the board but noted 
that much attention is now focused on particular markets for particular prod- 
ucts, such as plywood in Japan or cigarettes in Korea. Is there a history of such 
industry-specific efforts, and, if not, what caused that change in trade policy? 
Niskanen responded that, as a consequence of the prior tariff negotiations, 
average tariffs had dropped substantially. During the 1980s, for example, the 
average tariff in Japan dropped to approximately 2 percent, as compared to 4 
percent in the United States. Thus, tariffs are no longer the effective or mar- 
ginal trade restraint; nontariff barriers are. Some of  these other barriers are 
more difficult to negotiate on a multilateral basis, so pressure turned toward 
using other instruments, like Section 301, to reduce the barriers. 
Feldstein  concurred with Niskanen’s explanation. He recalled that former 
Treasury Secretary Mike Blumenthal had once described an experience he had 
had as a trade negotiator. He had successfully negotiated substantial reductions 
in tariff rates in an earlier GATT round, and then he was told by  the French 
negotiators that it was a waste of  his effort because trade would now be re- 
stricted through administrative procedures to the same end as before. To ac- 
complish any actual change, he would have to fight the battles in a new, more 
detailed arena. 
Richardson  said that there were precedents for market-opening, export- 
oriented negotiations. Certain Tokyo Round codes from the late  1970s had 687  Trade Policy 
been viewed as devices for enhancing U.S. markets, specifically the govern- 
ment procurement code, the standards code, and the civil aircraft code. Of 
these, civil aircraft was a success, but the others were generally regarded as 
having had little effect. Those codes were rules oriented, so the American per- 
ception became that rules do not work as market-opening devices. 
Thomas Enders suggested that what was different about the 1980s was that 
the international system had come under intolerable pressure when U.S. policy 
shifted toward fiscal ease and monetary tightness at the same time that Europe 
and Japan moved in the opposite direction. He felt that this pressure was much 
more severe than the pressures on trade in earlier decades and that it probably 
stimulated the great proliferation of administrative interferences with trade as 
well as the enormous complexity of the Trade Act of  1988. The question has 
now become whether these effects can be reversed. 
Frankel noted the hypothesis that protectionist pressures are greater when- 
ever the dollar is overvalued in real terms. The three most recent episodes of 
such an overvaluation were  1971-73,  1976-77,  and  1981-85.  Frankel sug- 
gested an alternative hypothesis that the trade deficit is a more important driv- 
ing factor than the dollar itself. 
Michael Mussa argued that, given the pressures that existed, U.S. trade pol- 
icy in the 1980s was not all that bad. He noted that, since the turnaround in 
1986, real U.S. exports have expanded by 60 percent. The U.S. manufacturing 
industry has recovered a great deal from the circumstances of the early 1980s 
despite the complaints of individual industries. And the Free Trade Agreement 
negotiated with Canada was an important accomplishment. 
Further, while  the  Reagan  administration did  bend  before  the  political 
winds, it was not totally lacking in backbone. Congress pushed consistently 
for even greater protection for the textile industry, and the administration ve- 
toed those actions with equal consistency. Mussa thought that there may have 
been a political game at work there: Congress voted majorities almost equal to 
the amount required to override the president’s veto, but not quite, and they 
therefore got credit with their textile constituents without having to fear that 
the “dirty deed” would be done. 
The Omnibus Trade Bill is not all that bad either, given the pressures of 
the time. This is particularly due to the efforts of Senator Lloyd Bentsen and 
Representative Dan Rostenkowski, who prevented a lot of potentially damag- 
ing legislation from being included with the bill. Although Super 301 may be 
imperfect in some aspects, a reasonable  job was done under the circumstances, 
and some specific trade actions taken under Section 301 have been very suc- 
cessful. Opening the Japanese market to beef and citrus, for example, has been 
a good thing for both countries. The important thing is to pick the right targets 
for trade policy changes: by  and large, the trade representatives have done a 
good job of picking battles that can be won. 
Finally, the administration’s free trade rhetoric had  an  important impact 
around the world. Mexico moved away from a very protectionist trade policy 688  Summary of Discussion 
toward a more open trade policy. There has been a similar trend in a wide 
variety of countries, and, in part, this can be attributed to the impact of U.S. 
free market rhetoric and the general orientation of the Reagan administration. 
Russell Long put in a word on behalf of Congress. He pointed out that Con- 
gress and the public are not educated in the finer points of trade theory; conse- 
quently,  they  look  at  more  direct  issues.  Someone  in  the  domestic  rice- 
producing industry, for example, might point to the fact that the Japanese pay 
about six times as much to produce rice but are unwilling to buy rice from U.S. 
producers. This raises the question, in their minds, of  why the United States 
buys Japanese cars when they will not buy our rice. Members of Congress feel 
a responsibility to protect people, and sometimes that results in actions that do 
not agree with a more idealistic view of the situation. 
William Poole raised the issue of whether industries that are granted relief 
ought to be required to give something in return. The problem with this ap- 
proach is that many of these industries are declining permanently; they are at 
a comparative disadvantage. In the long run, nothing but protectionism will 
maintain these industries, so they cannot realistically be asked for much com- 
mitment in return for protection. 
Feldstein agreed and added that those industries that will be viable in the 
long run will probably take steps to become more competitive anyway. Ford, 
for example, has become much more competitive in car manufacturing. But 
anybody could submit a seemingly convincing statement to the Commerce De- 
partment or the ITC explaining the thirty-two things they were going to do to 
shore up their industry and cut costs. It is hard to see how they could be held 
to this list except in the case of highly quantitative statements such as intended 
investment rates, for example. 
David Stockman maintained that neither the auto nor the steel agreement 
was as bad as had been suggested. He discussed the auto import restrictions 
first, looking at both the process by  which they were created and their conse- 
quences over the decade. There had been a great deal of pressure on the Hill 
to protect the auto industry, and in addition there was the Danforth bill. Perhaps 
that bill would have passed, but it could have been vetoed, and the veto cer- 
tainly would have been sustained. There was a new secretary of Transportation, 
however, who believed that he was responsible for policy on cars, to the exclu- 
sion of the Commerce Department, which was responsible for commerce, and 
the ITC, which was in charge of  trade. So the new  secretary, Drew Lewis, 
“conspired with Ed Meese and others who wore their Adam Smith ties every 
day.” They concluded that the Japanese should be induced to take responsibil- 
ity for quotas themselves. 
Thus, the Japanese were presented with an ultimatum: either they imposed 
a quota on themselves, voluntarily, or the administration would acquiesce to 
the Danforth bill, and it would be signed into law. Soon the White House re- 
ceived a phone call in which the president was informed that the Japanese had 
decided to take a statesmanlike course. So the president proceeded to a meet- 689  Trade Policy 
ing of his Economic Policy Advisory Board and announced that the adminis- 
tration had gotten very lucky. They were not going to have to face the auto trade 
issue, as the Japanese had decided, surprisingly, to take action on their own. 
The  consequences of  these  shenanigans are the  more  interesting issue, 
Stockman argued. The “voluntary” restrictions created a tremendous scarcity 
of Japanese cars in the United States from 1981 to 1984. Until that time, it had 
not been clear that the Japanese would dominate the North American car indus- 
try. They were selling “econo-boxes” at the very low end of the market at a 
time when oil prices were $60.00 per barrel in today’s dollars. The Japanese 
did not have a permanent foothold in the marketplace, and their dealer network 
was made up of retread used car dealers and worse. 
In the early 1980s, however, the quota created monopoly rents, as Toyotas 
and Hondas were selling not at markdowns or with cash rebates but with huge 
premiums to the list price. The Japanese manufacturers allowed their dealers 
to keep these windfall profits, causing many failed Ford dealers to move over 
to Toyota, Honda, Nissan, Mazda, Mitsubishi, and so on. The infrastructure of 
the Japanese automobile distribution system was created during this period, 
giving the Japanese companies a permanent place in the auto market. 
Japanese car sales rose to over 1 million each year, about the same as today. 
With sales at that level, with a permanent distribution system in place, and with 
the brand equity that had been created in their cars as a result of  the early 
1980s, the Japanese could then proceed with the next logical step-they  made 
multibillion dollar capital investments to build state-of-the-art plants in the 
United States. 
Stockman argued that  this  whole development was, paradoxically, enor- 
mously positive for the North American automobile industry. Millions of cars 
and trucks are now being built in North America with state-of-the-art technol- 
ogy and the best management practices in the world automobile industry. The 
white elephants of the car industry were forced to retire much faster than might 
otherwise have been the case. In the end, the apparent policy mistake of  1981 
created, for the 1990s, a very strong 13-15  million unit per year North Ameri- 
can automobile industry based on sparkling new plants. 
In the case of  steel, the administration had a strong political motivation for 
adopting protectionist measures-the  negotiations on quotas were conducted 
only two months before the 1984 election because Drew Lewis had concluded 
that the Republicans would lose Pennsylvania without them. At the same time, 
there was concern that the solutions being developed by the Commerce Depart- 
ment were going to be worse and that the remedies responding to the large 
number of Section 201 cases at the ITC could have been even more damaging. 
Further, the industry had been demanding a 15 percent quota on all steel, which 
would have been very damaging to all the steel users in the U.S. economy. 
With a little finesse, the policymakers arrived at an 18.5 percent quota on fin- 
ished steel with a big loophole for slab. 
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Bill Brock pronounced it a victory for free trade on the very next day. And, in 
most years, the steel quotas have not even been filled. The changes in the mar- 
ket probably would have occurred without the influence of the quotas, owing 
simply to movements of  exchange rates, but passing the policy at the time may 
have prevented the application of  more damaging solutions. 
Weidenbaum pointed out that the Japanese auto producers shared rents with 
their dealers, as opposed to permitting the dealers to keep the entire excess. 
The increased corporate profits provided the funds used to develop higher- 
priced models such as the Infiniti and the Acura. 
Stem wanted to clarify the distinction between dumping laws and the Sec- 
tion 201 cases she had discussed in the context of the auto and steel industries. 
Section 201 cases deal with fair trade, responding to injury complaints and 
basically allowing an industry breathing space for a predetermined amount of 
time. In 201 cases, the president has the power to adjust the. ITC affirmative 
recommendation for import relief taking into account broader national eco- 
nomic and trade considerations.  In contrast, the dumping law does not contem- 
plate presidential exercise of  discretion over the administration of  the law, 
which tends to be highly technical but is often nevertheless controversial in its 
economic consequences. 
Lionel Olmer remarked that not all the Reagan administration’s trade policy 
interventions violated international law or the GATT. As Areeda mentioned, 
there is enormous flexibility permitted in the determinations  made under those 
regulations. The steel agreement, for example, is totally consistent with U.S. 
obligations under GATT.  Section 301, however, is inconsistent with GATT. 
The concept of fairness was enacted into law using the term reciprocity, which 
conveys some notion that there is a basic equity between the United States and 
its trading partners. 
Olmer emphasized also that the European Community and Japan had con- 
spired to allocate markets, including the United States, and that nothing had 
been done to stop them. This inaction had led to a perception of  enormous 
unfairness in the American business community, building pressure for some 
changes in trade policy. 